א׳
א׳הַנֵּדֶר נֶחְלָק לִשְׁתֵּי מַחֲלוֹקוֹת. הַחֵלֶק הָרִאשׁוֹן הוּא שֶׁיֶּאֱסֹר עַל עַצְמוֹ דְּבָרִים הַמֻּתָּרִים לוֹ כְּגוֹן שֶׁיֹּאמַר פֵּרוֹת מְדִינָה פְּלוֹנִית אֲסוּרִין עָלַי כָּל שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם אוֹ לְעוֹלָם. אוֹ מִין פְּלוֹנִי מִפֵּרוֹת הָעוֹלָם אוֹ פֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין עָלַי. בְּכָל לָשׁוֹן שֶׁיֶּאֱסֹר הֲרֵי זֶה נֶאֱסָר בָּהֶן. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין שָׁם שְׁבוּעָה כְּלָל וְלֹא הַזְכָּרַת שֵׁם וְלֹא כִּנּוּי. וְעַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר בַּתּוֹרָה (במדבר ל ג) "לֶאְסֹר אִסָּר עַל נַפְשׁוֹ". שֶׁיֶּאֱסֹר עַל עַצְמוֹ דְּבָרִים הַמֻּתָּרִים. וְכֵן אִם אָמַר הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי אִסָּר הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין וְחֵלֶק זֶה הוּא שֶׁאֲנִי קוֹרֵא אוֹתוֹ נִדְרֵי אִסָּר:
1There are two categories of vows: The first is to forbid oneself [from benefiting] from entities permitted to him;1For the intent of a vow is not to forbid what the Torah has prohibited, and certainly not to permit what the Torah has prohibited (Radbaz). e.g., he said: "The produce from this-and-this country is forbidden to me for 30 days" or "...forever." "This type of produce is forbidden to me" or "This produce is forbidden." Regardless of the language in which the prohibition is stated,2I.e., it need not be stated in Lashon HaKodesh (Biblical Hebrew). they become forbidden to him, even though there is no oath at all, nor did it mention God's name or a term used to describe Him.3As stated in Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:2, an oath must mention God's name or one of the terms used to describe Him. Concerning this, the Torah [Numbers 30:3] states: "To cause a prohibition to take effect upon his soul," i.e., to cause permitted entities to become forbidden to him. Similarly, such a vow takes effect if he says: "They are forbidden to me." I call this category: "vows involving prohibitions."
ב׳וְהַחֵלֶק הַשֵּׁנִי הוּא שֶׁיְּחַיֵּב עַצְמוֹ בְּקָרְבָּן שֶׁאֵינוֹ חַיָּב בּוֹ. כְּגוֹן שֶׁיֹּאמַר הֲרֵי עָלַי לְהָבִיא עוֹלָה. אוֹ הֲרֵי עָלַי לְהָבִיא שְׁלָמִים אוֹ מִנְחָה. הֲרֵי בְּהֵמָה זוֹ עוֹלָה אוֹ שְׁלָמִים. וְהָאוֹמֵר [הֲרֵי] עָלַי הוּא הַנִּקְרָא נֵדֶר. וְהָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי זוֹ הוּא הַנִּקְרָא נְדָבָה. וְהַנְּדָבָה וְהַנֵּדֶר מִמִּין אֶחָד הוּא אֶלָּא שֶׁהַנְּדָרִים חַיָּבִין בְּאַחֲרָיוּתָן וּנְדָבוֹת אֵין חַיָּבִין בְּאַחֲרָיוּתָן. וְעַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר בַּתּוֹרָה (דברים יב יז) "וּנְדָרֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר תִּדֹּר וְנִדְבֹתֶיךָ" וְגוֹ'. וְחֵלֶק זֶה הוּא שֶׁאֲנִי קוֹרֵא אוֹתוֹ נִדְרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ:
2The second category is to obligate himself for a sacrifice that he is not required to bring. For example, he said: "I obligate myself [to bring] a burnt offering," "I obligate myself to bring a peace offering," "...a meal offering," or "This animal is a burnt offering," or "...a peace offering."When he says: "I obligate myself [to bring]...", this is called a vow.4I.e., he is personally responsible to bring a sacrifice; there is no set animal designated for that purpose. When he says: "This is...", it is called a donation.5I.e., the animal is designated to be offered as a sacrifice; there is no obligation on the person. Donations and vows are of the same type [of pledges], but [the one making the pledge] is responsible for a vow.6I.e., if the animal which he originally intended to be sacrificed is lost, he must provide another one, because he accepted personal responsibility. See Halachot 25 and 26 with regard to the distinction between the two terms. With regard to a donations, by contrast, he is not responsible.7For it was only the one animal that was designated as a sacrifice. Concerning these the Torah states [Deuteronomy 12:17]: "Your vows which you pledge and your donations...." This category, I refer to as "vows of sanctification."
ג׳וְדִינֵי הַחֵלֶק הָרִאשׁוֹן וְעִנְיָנוֹ הֵם שֶׁאָנוּ מְבָאֲרִים בַּהֲלָכוֹת אֵלּוּ. אֲבָל דִּינֵי נִדְרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ וּמִשְׁפְּטֵיהֶם כֻּלָּם יִתְבָּאֲרוּ בִּמְקוֹמָם בְּהִלְכוֹת מַעֲשֵׂה הַקָּרְבָּנוֹת:
3The laws concerning the first category and its relevant matters are [the subject] we will discuss in these halachot. The laws concerning vows of sanctification and their particulars will be discussed in their appropriate place in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot.8See Chapters 6 and 9 of those halachot which explain the difference between these types of sacrifices. There are also occasional references to such vows in these halachot. See, for example, Halachah 17 of this chapter.
ד׳מִצְוַת עֲשֵׂה שֶׁל תּוֹרָה שֶׁיְּקַיֵּם אָדָם שְׁבוּעָתוֹ אוֹ נִדְרוֹ בֵּין שֶׁהָיָה מִנִּדְרֵי אִסָּר בֵּין שֶׁהָיָה מִנִּדְרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כג כד) "מוֹצָא שְׂפָתֶיךָ תִּשְׁמֹר וְעָשִׂיתָ כַּאֲשֶׁר נָדַרְתָּ" וְנֶאֱמַר (במדבר ל ג) "כְּכָל הַיֹּצֵא מִפִּיו יַעֲשֶׂה":
4It is a positive commandment of Scriptural origin for a person to carry out his oath or vow9Sefer HaMitzvot (positive commandment 94) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 575) include this commandment among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. whether it be a vow involving prohibitions or a vow of sanctification, as [Deuteronomy 23:24] states: "Heed the utterances of your mouth and do as you vowed." And [Numbers 30:3] states: "He shall act in accordance with all that he uttered with his mouth."10Although there are two different verses which point to the same commandment, they are counted only as one mitzvah. For the verse from Deuteronomy could be interpreted as a reinforcement for the negative commandment mentioned in the following verse and the verse from Numbers can be interpreted as referring only to vows involving prohibitions (Radbaz). In his Hasagot to Sefer HaMitzvot, the Ramban considers these as two separate mitzvot.
ה׳הָאוֹסֵר עַל עַצְמוֹ מִין מִמִּינֵי מַאֲכָל כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָמַר תְּאֵנִים אֲסוּרִין עָלַי אוֹ תְּאֵנִים שֶׁל מְדִינָה פְּלוֹנִית אֲסוּרִים עָלַי אוֹ תְּאֵנִים אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין עָלַי וְכַיּוֹצֵא בְּאֵלּוּ וְאָכַל מֵהֶן כָּל שֶׁהוּא לוֹקֶה מִן הַתּוֹרָה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר ל ג) "לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ". שֶׁאֵין לִנְדָרִים שִׁעוּר. שֶׁכָּל הַנּוֹדֵר מִדָּבָר הֲרֵי זֶה כִּמְפָרֵשׁ כָּל שֶׁהוּא. אָמַר אֲכִילָה מִפֵּרוֹת מְדִינָה פְּלוֹנִית אֲסוּרִין עָלַי אוֹ אֲכִילָה מִפֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה עַד שֶׁיֹּאכַל כְּזַיִת:
5When a person forbids himself from partaking of a particular type of food, e.g., he said: "Figs are forbidden to me," "Figs from such-and-such a country are forbidden to me," "These figs are forbidden to me," or the like, if he partakes of any amount of them, he is liable for lashes according to Scriptural Law,11As is the punishment prescribed for the violation of any negative commandment. Sefer HaMitzvot (negative commandment 157) and Sefer HaChinuch (mitzvah 407) include this prohibition among the 613 mitzvot of the Torah. as [Numbers, Ibid.] states: "He shall not desecrate his word."There is no minimum measure [for the desecration of] a vow, for by taking a vow [not to partake of] a substance, it is as if one explicitly stated that he would not partake of even the slightest amount.12As evident from the continuation of the Rambam's statements, were the person to have mentioned "eating" in his vow, we would have interpreted the prohibition as involving an olive-sized portion, the minimum measure for eating that applies with regard to other prohibitions. Since he did not, the implication is that even the slightest amount is forbidden. Compare to Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:1. If one said: "It is forbidden for me to eat the produce of this-and-this country" or "...to eat these fruit," he does not receive lashes unless he partakes of an olive-sized portion.
ו׳אָסַר עַל עַצְמוֹ אֲכִילָה מִן הַתְּאֵנִים וַאֲכִילָה מִן הָעֲנָבִים בֵּין בְּנֵדֶר אֶחָד בֵּין בִּשְׁנֵי נְדָרִים הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מִצְטָרְפִין לִכְזַיִת. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
6If a person forbade himself from eating figs and grapes - whether in two vows or in one - the two can be combined to make up the measure of an olive-sized portion.13This does not apply with regard to oaths (Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:8). Even with regard to vows, it applies only when one uses the expression "eating." The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam and maintains that the law applies only when the two are included in the same oath. Their difference of opinion revolves around the understanding of Sh'vuot 22a. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
ז׳הָאוֹמֵר פֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ עָלַי קָרְבָּן אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר הֲרֵי הֵם כְּקָרְבָּן אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לַחֲבֵרוֹ כָּל מַה שֶּׁאֹכַל עִמְּךָ עָלַי קָרְבָּן אוֹ כְּקָרְבָּן אוֹ הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי קָרְבָּן. הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין עָלָיו מִפְּנֵי שֶׁאֶפְשָׁר שֶׁיִּדֹּר אָדָם קָרְבָּן וְיַעֲשֶׂה בְּהֵמָה שֶׁהָיְתָה חֹל קָרְבָּן וְתֵאָסֵר:
7When a person says: "This produce is considered like a sacrifice," or he tells a colleague: "Everything that I partake of with you is a sacrifice,"14I.e., the person wants to forbid himself from eating together with his colleague. "...like a sacrifice," "or considered like a sacrifice for me," they are forbidden to him. For it is possible that a person will make a vow for a sacrifice and make an animal that is ordinary a sacrifice and thus be forbidden for him.15Just as a person cannot partake of a sacrifice until it is offered, so, too, he cannot partake of an entity forbidden by a vow. Just as the consecration of a sacrifice comes about because of a person's vow and his vow is what causes the sacrifice to become forbidden, so too, a vow causes an entity to be forbidden.See Hilchot Meilah 4:9-10 which explains that with regard to the person forbidden by the vow, the article becomes like consecrated property. Hence, he is obligated to bring a sacrifice in atonement if he benefits from the article.
ח׳אֲבָל הָאוֹמֵר פֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ עָלַי אוֹ מִין פְּלוֹנִי עָלַי אוֹ מַה שֶּׁאֹכַל עִם פְּלוֹנִי עָלַי כִּבְשַׂר חֲזִיר אוֹ כְּעַכּוּ"ם אוֹ כִּנְבֵלוֹת וּטְרֵפוֹת וְכַיּוֹצֵא בְּאֵלּוּ הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מֻתָּרִין וְאֵין כָּאן נֵדֶר. שֶׁאִי אֶפְשָׁר שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ בְּשַׂר חֲזִיר כִּבְשַׂר חֲזִיר:
8If, however, a person says: "This produce is considered for me...", "This type of produce is considered for me...", "What I will eat with so-and-so will be considered as pig meat," "...as a false deity," "...as nevelot and trefot," or the like, they are permitted and no vow takes effect. [The rationale is that] it is impossible for a person to make something that is not pig meat as pig meat.16For these substances are inherently forbidden; they do not become prohibited because of man's statements. An animal consecrated as a sacrifice, by contrast, is inherently permitted. It is only man's statements that cause it to become forbidden.
ט׳זֶה הַכְּלָל כָּל הַמֵּשִׂים דְּבָרִים הַמֻּתָּרִים כַּדְּבָרִים הָאֲסוּרִים אִם אוֹתוֹ דָּבָר הָאָסוּר יָכוֹל לַעֲשׂוֹתוֹ בְּנֵדֶר הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִים. וְאִם אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַעֲשׂוֹתוֹ בְּנֵדֶר הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מֻתָּרִין:
9This is the general principle [that applies] whenever anyone attempts to have permitted entities considered as forbidden entities: If he could have endowed that forbidden entity with its status by taking a vow,17As a person can cause a sacrifice to become forbidden.The Rambam is explaining a fundamental principle with regard to vows. A vow becomes effective when a person establishes an equation between an entity (e.g., produce) and another entity (e.g., a sacrifice), provided it is possible for him to cause the latter entity to become forbidden on the basis of his vow alone. [the permitted entities] are forbidden. If he cannot endow it with its status by taking a vow,18I.e., objects which are inherently forbidden. [the permitted entities] remain permitted.
י׳הַחַטָּאת וְהָאָשָׁם אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינָן בָּאִין בְּנֵדֶר וּנְדָבָה כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר בִּמְקוֹמוֹ אֶפְשָׁר לַנּוֹדֵר לְהָבִיא אוֹתָם מֵחֲמַת נִדְרוֹ. שֶׁהַנּוֹדֵר בְּנָזִיר מֵבִיא חַטָּאת וְאִם נִטְמָא מֵבִיא אָשָׁם כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר. לְפִיכָךְ הָאוֹמֵר פֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ עָלַי כְּחַטָּאת אוֹ כְּאָשָׁם אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר הֲרֵי הֵן חַטָּאת אוֹ הֲרֵי הֵן אָשָׁם הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין. וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר בְּאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי הֵן עוֹלָה אוֹ שְׁלָמִים אוֹ מִנְחָה אוֹ תּוֹדָה שֶׁהֵן אֲסוּרִין שֶׁכָּל אֵלּוּ בָּאִין בְּנֵדֶר וּנְדָבָה:
10Sin-offerings and guilt-offerings cannot be brought as vows or as donations, as will be explained in the appropriate place.19See Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot 14:8, Hilchot Shegagot 1:1. These sacrifices are required when a person transgresses a prohibition. If he does not transgress, he may not bring such a sacrifice and if he does transgress, he is compelled to do so. Offering it is not dependent on his vow. Nevertheless, it is possible for a person making a vow to offer them as a result of his vow. For a person who takes a nazirite vow must bring a sin offering,20Hilchot Nazirut 6:11; 8:1. and if he becomes impure,21Due to contact with a human corpse (ibid. 7:2). he must bring a guilt offering, as will be stated.22Ibid. 6:11; see also Hilchot Shegagot 9:1. Accordingly, when one says: "This produce is considered for me like a sin-offering" or "...like a guilt-offering," or he says: "It is a sin-offering" or "It is a guilt-offering," it is forbidden. Needless to say, if he says: "It is a burnt-offering," "...a peace-offering," "...a meal-offering," or "...a thanksgiving-offering," it is forbidden, for all of these offerings can be brought as vows or as donations.23And thus bringing them is obviously dependent on his making a vow.
י״אאֲבָל הָאוֹמֵר פֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ עָלַי כְּחַלַּת אַהֲרֹן אוֹ כִּתְרוּמָתוֹ הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מֻתָּרִין שֶׁאֵין שָׁם דֶּרֶךְ לְהָבִיא אֵלּוּ בְּנֵדֶר וּנְדָבָה:
11If, however, one says: "This produce is considered for me like the challah [brought] to Aaron" or "...like the terumah for him,"24Challah refers to a portion that must be separated from dough and given to a priest. Terumah refers to a portion of grain that must be separated and given to a priest. Since they may not be eaten by a non-priest, one might think that they could be the subject of a vow. Aaron is mentioned, because he is the progenitor of the priestly family. it is permitted. For there is no way that these can be brought as vows or as donations.25A person is required to separate these portions from his dough or grain. Although the amount he gives and the designation of the priest to whom he gives them is dependent on his will, he is obligated to make the gift. The Ra'avad offers a different rationale for this law.
י״בהָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי הַפֵּרוֹת הָאֵלּוּ עָלַי כְּנוֹתָר כְּפִגּוּל כְּבָשָׂר טָמֵא שֶׁל קָדָשִׁים הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין שֶׁהֲרֵי עֲשָׂאָן כִּבְשַׂר קָרְבָּן מִכָּל מָקוֹם:
12If one says: "This produce is considered for me like notar,"26Sacrificial meat that was left after its prescribed time and hence, forbidden to be eaten."...like piggul,"27Sacrifices that were offered with the intent that they be eaten at a time when it was forbidden to do so and hence, become forbidden to be eaten. or "...like sacrificial meat that has become impure,"28And is thus forbidden to be eaten. it is forbidden. For the person has, nonetheless, made the substance like sacrificial meat.29It is beyond his capacity to make the object concerning which he is taking a vow bound by any of the prohibitions mentioned. Nevertheless, all of these prohibitions involve sacrificial meat and sacrificial meat is forbidden to be eaten before it was offered in a proper way, because of his oath as above. Hence, the vow can take effect.
י״גהָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי כְּמַעֲשַׂר בְּהֵמָה הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין הוֹאִיל וּקְדֻשָּׁתוֹ בִּידֵי אָדָם. הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי כִּבְכוֹר הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מֻתָּרִין שֶׁאֵין קְדֻשָּׁתוֹ בִּידֵי אָדָם וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהַתְפִּיסוֹ בְּנֵדֶר שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא כז כו) "לֹא יַקְדִּישׁ אִישׁ אֹתוֹ":
13If one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like the tithe-sacrifice of an animal,"30As Leviticus 27:32 states, a person must bring every tenth animal born to his herd as a tithe offering. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 9. it is forbidden, for the sanctity [of the tithe-sacrifices] is conveyed upon them by mortals.31Although we are required to separate these offerings, the tithing process through which the holiness is conveyed upon the animal is a result of man's actions.It is possible to differentiate between such offerings and terumah, for even before the terumah was separated, the grain was not permitted to be eaten, because it was tevel. The animals, by contrast, could have been slaughtered, before the tithe was separated (see Radbaz, quoting Rabbenu Asher). If he says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a firstborn,"32Which is sanctified from birth and offered as a sacrifice. it is permitted, for the sanctity [of the firstborn] is not conveyed by mortals.33Instead, it is sanctified from birth. It cannot be designated [for another sacred purpose] with a vow, as [Leviticus 27:26] states: "A man should not consecrate it."34The Kessef Mishneh quotes a responsum from the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham who addresses the following question that was posed to him: The prooftext from Leviticus has been interpreted by the Sifri as teaching that a firstborn may not be consecrated as another sacrifice (see Hilchot Temurah 4:11 where the Rambam quotes this concept). Moreover, although the firstborn is intrinsically holy, it is a mitzvah to consecrate it for that sacrifice (quoted by the Rambam in Hilchot Bechorot 1:5), and thus seemingly, the holiness is conveyed upon it by a mortal's actions.Rav Avraham replies that since the holiness of the firstborn is inherent and it cannot be changed to that of another sacrifice, that is a proof that a vow cannot affect it. With regard to using a first born as the basis for a vow, see also Halachah 15 and notes.
י״דאָמַר הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי כְּחֶרְמֵי שָׁמַיִם הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין. שֶׁחֶרְמֵי שָׁמַיִם לְבֶדֶק הַבַּיִת. הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי כִּתְרוּמַת הַלִּשְׁכָּה כִּתְמִידִים כְּדִירִים כְּעֵצִים כְּאִשִּׁים כְּמִזְבֵּחַ אוֹ כְּאַחַד מִמְּשַׁמְּשֵׁי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ. כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָמַר הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי כְּיָעִים כְּמִזְרָקוֹת כְּמִזְלָגוֹת וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי כְּהֵיכָל כִּירוּשָׁלַיִם הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הַזְכִּיר שֵׁם קָרְבָּן. שֶׁכָּל דְּבָרִים אֵלּוּ עִנְיָנָם כְּאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי קָרְבָּן:
14If one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a devotion offering for Above,"35See Hilchot Arachin V'Charamim 6:1 for a description of the nature of this pledge. it is forbidden, for the devotion offering for Above are [set aside] for improvements within the Temple.36And are forbidden to be used for mundane purposes. Thus they represent an entity that was forbidden by man's pledge.[A vow takes effect and produce] becomes forbidden although the person did not mention a sacrifice [if he makes any of the following statements]: "[This produce] is considered for me like the donations for the chamber,"37The Hebrew term terumat halishkah refers to the money collected from the half-shekel donations collected from the Jewish people and used for the communal sacrifices offered in the Temple. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 2. "...like the daily sacrifices," "...like the storage rooms,"38I.e., the chambers in the Temple. This and several of the following interpretations are based on the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 1:3). "...like the wood,"39For the altar. "...like the fire-offerings,"40I.e., the portions of the sacrifices offered on the Temple altar. "...like the altar," or "...like any of the utensils of the altar," e.g., he said: "[This produce] is considered for me like the altar rakes,"41Used to rake the ashes on the altar. "...like the ewers [for the blood of the sacrifices],"42Used to collect the blood from the sacrifices and then pour it on the altar. "...like the altar forks,"43Used to move portions of the sacrifices around on the altar's fire, so that they would be consumed by it. or the like. [This law also applies] if he says: "This produce] is considered for me like the Temple,"44I.e., like the sacrifices offered in the Temple. "...like Jerusalem."45Like the sacrifices eaten in Jerusalem. [The rationale is that] all of these statements are similar to saying: "[This produce] is considered for me like a sacrifice."
ט״והָיָה לְפָנָיו בְּשַׂר קֹדֶשׁ אֲפִלּוּ הָיָה בְּשַׂר שְׁלָמִים אַחַר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים שֶׁהוּא מֻתָּר לַזָּרִים וְאָמַר הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי כְּבָשָׂר זֶה הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין. שֶׁלֹּא הִתְפִּיס אֶלָּא בְּעִקָּרוֹ שֶׁהָיָה אָסוּר. אֲבָל אִם הָיָה בְּשַׂר בְּכוֹר אִם לִפְנֵי זְרִיקַת דָּמִים הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר וְאִם לְאַחר זְרִיקַת דָּמִים הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר:
15[When there was] sacrificial meat - even meat from a peace offering whose blood had been poured [on the altar] which is permitted to non-priests - before a person and he said: "[This produce] is considered for me like this meat," it is forbidden. [The rationale is that] he attached [his vow] to the fundamental element of the meat, and that was forbidden.46Since fundamentally, before its blood was poured on the altar, the meat was forbidden, that is the factor that we consider. We do not take into consideration the fact that afterwards it became permitted. This ruling is the subject of an unresolved question in Nedarim 11b. Hence, we rule stringently (Radbaz, Kessef Mishneh).[Different rules apply if] the meat was from a firstborn sacrifice. If its blood had not been poured [on the altar], [the produce] is forbidden.47For then it is forbidden to everyone. Hence one might say that just as his designation of the firstborn causes the meat to be forbidden, making a vow using a firstborn sacrifice as a basis is effective.This ruling has created difficulty among the commentaries, because in Halachah 13 the Rambam ruled that a firstborn animal cannot be used as the basis of a vow. Similarly, as the Ra'avad points out, the Rambam's ruling does not appear to be consistent with either of the positions mentioned in Nedarim 12b, the source for this halachah. This leads the Kessef Mishneh to conclude that there was a printing error in the text of the Mishneh Torah and the proper version is "[the produce] is permitted." He states that he found an ancient text that reads this way. Similarly, the Yemenite manuscripts of the Mishneh Torah read in that manner, omitting the last phrase entirely.The Kessef Mishneh, however, notes that the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham defends the ruling in the existing text of the Mishneh Torah, explaining that there is a difference between a firstborn sacrifice and the meat of a firstborn sacrifice. If it had been poured, it is permitted.
ט״זיֵשׁ מְקוֹמוֹת שֶׁאַנְשֵׁיהֶם עִלְּגִים וּמַפְסִידִין אֶת הַלָּשׁוֹן וּמְכַנִּין עַל דָּבָר בְּדָבָר אַחֵר הוֹלְכִין שָׁם אַחַר הַכִּנּוּי. כֵּיצַד כָּל כִּנּוּיֵי קָרְבָּן כְּקָרְבָּן. הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי קוֹנַם קוֹנָח קוֹנָז הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ כִּנּוּיִין לְקָרְבָּן. חֵרֶק חֵרֶף חֵרֶךְ הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ כִּנּוּיִין לְחֵרֶם. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה הוֹלְכִין אַחַר לְשׁוֹן כְּלַל הָעָם בְּאוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם וּבְאוֹתוֹ זְמַן:
16There are places where people are inarticulate and mispronounce words, calling subjects by different names. [In those places,] we follow the meaning of the local term.What is meant by the statement that all the terms used for the word korban, "sacrifice," are equivalent to the term korban? When one says: "[This produce] is considered for me like a konam," "...a konach," or "...a konaz," they are all terms referring to a korban. Cherek, cheref, and cherech are all terms referring to a cherem (dedication offering).Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. We follow the language used by people at large in that place and at that time.48For this is representative of the person's intent. Taking this concept further, the Rama Yoreh De'ah 207:1) quotes opinions that maintain that this surely applies to vows made in gentile languages. And conversely, he also mentions views that maintain that if someone makes a vow using the wording of our Sages without understanding what he is saying, it does not take effect.
י״זוּכְשֵׁם שֶׁאוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ בְּכִנּוּיִין כָּךְ אִם הִקְדִּישׁ בְּכִנּוּיִין הֲרֵי זֶה הֶקְדֵּשׁ. וְכִנּוּיֵי הַכִּנּוּיִין מֻתָּרִין בֵּין בְּנִדְרֵי אִסָּר בֵּין בְּנִדְרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ:
17Just as a person can make a vow forbidding entities to himself with such terms, so, too, if he consecrates an entity with such terms, the entity is consecrated. Nicknames for such terms,49Nedarim 10b gives examples: miknamna, miknachna, and miknasna. however, are not binding50For they are very distant from the original wording [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 207:1)]. Kin'at Eliyahu states that apparently, they also would not have been recognized universally as having the desired intent. whether for vows involving prohibitions or vows involving the consecration of property.
י״חהָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ מַה שֶּׁאֹכַל עִמְּךָ לֹא יְהֵא חֻלִּין אוֹ לֹא יְהֵא כָּשֵׁר אוֹ לֹא יְהֵא דְּכִי אוֹ לֹא יְהֵא טָהוֹר הֲרֵי זֶה כְּמִי שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ כָּל מַה שֶּׁאֹכַל עִמְּךָ יְהֵא קָרְבָּן שֶׁהוּא אָסוּר. וְכֵן אִם אָמַר לוֹ כָּל מַה שֶּׁאֹכַל עִמְּךָ טָמֵא אוֹ נוֹתָר אוֹ פִּגּוּל הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר:
18If a person tells a colleague: "Whatever I eat from your [property] will not be like ordinary food," "...will not be kosher," or "...will not be pure,"51The Rambam states this expression twice: once in Aramaic and once in Lashon HaKodesh. it is as if he told him: "Everything that I eat from your [property] will be like a sacrifice,"52I.e., the opposite of ordinary food is sacrificial food that is consecrated. Similarly with regard to his statement about impure food, we assume that his intent is an impure sacrifice in which instance, his vow is effective. Although it is possible that his intent is impure terumah (in which instance, his vow would not be binding), we follow the principle (Chapter 2, Halachah 7): Whenever there is a doubt concerning the effectiveness of a vow, we rule stringently (Rabbenu Nissim). which is forbidden. Similarly, if he tells him: "Everything that I eat from your [property] will be an impure [sacrifice]," "...notar," or piggul,"53See Halachah 11 for a definition of these terms. it is forbidden.
י״טהָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ לֹא חֻלִּין לֹא אֹכַל לְךָ הֲרֵי זֶה כְּמִי שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ מַה שֶּׁאֹכַל לְךָ לֹא יְהֵא חֻלִּין אֶלָּא קָרְבָּן. וְכֵן אִם אָמַר הַקָרְבָּן שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ קָרְבָּן שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ כְּקָרְבָּן שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר. אֲבָל הָאוֹמֵר הַקָּרְבָּן לֹא אֹכַל לְךָ אוֹ כְּקָרְבָּן לֹא אֹכַל לְךָ אוֹ לְקָרְבָּן לֹא אֹכַל לְךָ אוֹ קָרְבָּן לֹא אֹכַל לְךָ אוֹ לֹא קָרְבָּן לֹא אֹכַל לְךָ כָּל אֵלּוּ מֻתָּרִים. שֶׁאֵין מַשְׁמַע דְּבָרִים אֵלּוּ אֶלָּא שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע בְּקָרְבָּן שֶׁלֹּא יֹאכַל לָזֶה וְהַנִּשְׁבָּע בְּקָרְבָּן אֵינוֹ כְּלוּם אוֹ שֶׁנָּדַר שֶׁלֹּא יֹאכַל לוֹ קָרְבָּן:
19When a person tells a colleague: "Not ordinary food will I not eat from your [property]," it is as if he told him:54I.e., we interpret his statement as the Rambam explains. "What I will eat from your [property] will not be like ordinary food, but instead, like a sacrifice."55And hence, forbidden to be eaten (Nedarim 11b).Similarly, if he tells him: "The sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," "A sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," or "Like a sacrifice if I eat from your [property]," he is forbidden [to eat from his property].56Even though none of these expressions is precise, they are still close enough to imply that his intent is that he is forbidding eating with his colleague like a sacrifice is forbidden. If, by contrast, he tells him: "The sacrifice I will not eat from your [property]," "Like a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," "For a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," "A sacrifice I will not eat from your [property]," or "Not a sacrifice, I will not eat from your [property]," he is permitted in all of these instances.57I.e., his oath is not binding, for the reasons the Rambam continues to explain. For all of these expressions do not have any implication other than he is taking an oath by a sacrifice that he will not eat from his [property] and taking an oath on a sacrifice is not binding. Alternatively, [his intent can be interpreted] as taking a vow that he will not partake of a sacrifice with him.
כ׳חֻלִּין שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ הַחֻלִּין שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ כְּחֻלִּין שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ חֻלִּין שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל לְךָ הַחֻלִּין שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל לְךָ כְּחֻלִּין שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל לְךָ הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר:
20[If he tells him:] "Ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "The ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "Like ordinary food, I will eat from your [property]," "Ordinary food, I will not eat from your [property]," "The ordinary food, I will eat not with you," "Like ordinary food, I will not eat from your [property]," it is permitted for him [to eat from his property].58Because he does not mention a sacrifice in any of these expressions. The Ra'avad mentions that from Nedarim 11a, it would appear that some of these expressions would involve a vow. The Radbaz and the Kessef Mishneh justify the Rambam's rulings.
כ״אאֲבָל הָאוֹמֵר לֹא טָמֵא שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ לֹא נוֹתָר שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ לֹא פִּגּוּל שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ אָסוּר. שֶׁמַּשְׁמָעוֹ שֶׁל דָּבָר דָּבָר שֶׁאֹכַל הוּא שֶׁיִּהְיֶה פִּגּוּל אוֹ טָמֵא לְפִיכָךְ לֹא אֹכַל לְךָ:
21If, by contrast, he says: "No impure [sacrifices] will I eat from your [property]," "No notar, will I eat from your [property]," or "No piggul will I eat from your [property]," he is forbidden. [The vow takes effect, because] the intent of his statements appears to be: "What I will eat will be piggul or impure. Therefore, I will not eat from your [property]."59Based on Nedarim 10b, the Lechem Mishneh explains that we offer this interpretation, because we assume that a person will not make statements unnecessarily. Hence, since his statements could be interpreted as implying a vow, we offer such an interpretation. The Kessef Mishneh struggles with the meaning of the Rambam's words and suggests that perhaps an error crept into the text.
כ״בבַּהֵיכָל שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ הֵיכָל שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ לֹא הֵיכָל שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ אָסוּר. הֵיכָל שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל לְךָ כְּהֵיכָל שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל לְךָ לֹא הֵיכָל שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל לְךָ מֻתָּר. שֶׁזֶּה כְּמִי שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע בַּהֵיכָל שֶׁלֹּא יֹאכַל. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
22[If he says:] "By the Temple, I will eat from your [property]," "The Temple, I will eat from your [property]," or "No Temple, I will eat from your [property]," [the vow is effective,60For he is forbidding himself from eating with his colleague, like he is forbidden to partake of the Temple's sacrifices. and] it is forbidden. "The Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," "Like the Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," or "No Temple, I will not eat from your [property]," he is permitted.61Concluding with a negative expression implies that this is his intent, as in Halachah 19 (Radbaz). In this instance as well, the Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's wording. For this is like taking an oath by the Temple, that he will not eat from his [property]. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
כ״גהָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ מֻדָּר אֲנִי מִמְּךָ מַשְׁמַע דָּבָר זֶה שֶׁלֹּא יְדַבֵּר עִמּוֹ. מֻפְרָשׁ אֲנִי מִמְּךָ מַשְׁמָעוֹ שֶׁלֹּא יִשָּׂא וְיִתֵּן עִמּוֹ. מְרֻחָק אֲנִי מִמְּךָ מַשְׁמָעוֹ שֶׁלֹּא יֵשֵׁב בְּאַרְבַּע אַמּוֹתָיו. וְכֵן אִם אָמַר לוֹ מְנֻדֶּה אֲנִי לְךָ אוֹ מְשַׁמַּתְנָא מִמְּךָ. אֲבָל אִם אָמַר לוֹ מֻדָּר אֲנִי מִמְּךָ שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל לְךָ. אוֹ מֻפְרָשׁ אֲנִי מִמְּךָ שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל לְךָ אוֹ מְרֻחָק אֲנִי מִמְּךָ שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל לְךָ הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר לֶאֱכל. וְאִם אָכַל כְּזַיִת מִכָּל נְכָסָיו לוֹקֶה מִשּׁוּם (במדבר ל ג) "לֹא יַחֵל דְּבָרוֹ":
23When a person tells a colleague, "I am taking a vow from you," his statement implies that he will not speak with him.62This and the subsequent statements of this clause do not imply that he is forbidden to partake of the other person's food. "I am separate from you" implies that he will not do business with him. "I am distant from you" implies that he will not sit within four cubits of him. That same implication is conveyed by telling him: "I am ostracized from you" or "I am banned from you."63For this restriction applies when a person is under a ban of ostracism (see Hilchot Talmud Torah 7:4).The Turei Zahav 206:1 mentions the opinion of Rabbenu Asher who maintains that these vows are not effective at all.If, however, says "I am taking a vow from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," "I am separate from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," or "I am distant from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," he is forbidden to eat from his [property].64He may, however, speak to him (Radbaz).Although the person does not mention the terms "prohibition" or "sacrifice" in his vow, since his intent is obviously to prohibit himself from benefiting from the other person, that prohibition takes effect. This reflects the principle (Nedarim 3a): "The handles of vows are as vows." The intent is that even a statement that, like a handle to a cup, is merely an auxiliary to a vow is binding like a vow itself. See also a responsum authored by the Rambam's son, Rav Avraham, which explains that even when the intent of one's statements are not entirely clear, as in the present instance, they may constitute a vow, provided their intent is somewhat clear. This principle is also quoted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 206:1). If he eats an olive-sized portion [of food] from any of his property, he is liable for lashes for [violating the prohibition]: "He shall not desecrate his word."
כ״דאָמַר לוֹ מְנֻדֶּה אֲנִי לְךָ שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל לְךָ אֵינוֹ אוֹכֵל לוֹ וְאִם אָכַל אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. אָמַר לוֹ נָדִינָא מִמְּךָ הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר לֵהָנוֹת:
24If he tells him: "I am ostracized from you in that I will not eat from your [property]," he may not eat from his [property, but] if he does, he is not liable for lashes.65From Nedarim 7a, it appears that this expression creates an unresolved question whether the one taking the vow was merely promising not to come within four cubits of the other person or whether he intended to forbid partaking of that person's property. Because of the doubt, he is forbidden to partake of the property, but is not given lashes. If he tells him: "I have drifted66The term the Rambam uses relates to the Hebrew words na and nad which mean "wander" and "roam." Nevertheless, Nedarim 7a states that all authorities agree that this expression creates a binding commitment. from you," he is forbidden to benefit from him.67Since he does not use the words "eat" or "partake," we assume that he intended to create a more encompassing prohibition.The Ra'avad differs and maintains that the expression means that he is not allowed to partake of his property in his presence. That interpretation is also discussed by the Kessef Mishneh.
כ״ההָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ הֲרֵי עָלַי כְּנִדְרֵי רְשָׁעִים אִם אֹכַל לְךָ שֶׁמִּנִּדְרֵיהֶם נָזִיר וְקָרְבָּן וּשְׁבוּעָה וְאָכַל חַיָּב בְּכֻלָּן. וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי עָלַי כִּנְדָבוֹת כְּשֵׁרִים שֶׁמִּנִּדְבוֹתָם נָזִיר וְקָרְבָּן הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב:
25When a person tells a colleague: "Let it be considered for me like the vows of the wicked who make nazirite vows, vows for a sacrifice, and oaths,68The Rambam is referring to the wording of the Mishnah (Nedarim 1:1). The wicked make vows hastily and moreover, obligate themselves for vows which constitute a commitment incumbent on their person (Halachah 2). See also Chapter 13, Halachah 25, which states that it is undesirable to make vows. if I eat from your [property]," should he eat [from his property], he is liable for all of the above.69I.e., he must accept a nazirite vow, bring a burnt offering, and is liable for lashes for taking a false sh'vuat bitui.Similarly, if he says: "Let it be considered for me like the pledges of the upright who make nazirite pledges70See Chapter 13, Halachah 23. and donations for a sacrifice,71The term the Rambam refers to "donations," i.e., animals which the person designates as a sacrifices, but if lost do not create a lien on his person (Halachah 2). if I eat from your [property," should he eat from his property,] he is liable.72To uphold a nazirite vow and to bring a sacrifice. He is not, however, liable for an oath, because he did not mention an oath in his statements, since the upright do not take oaths casually.
כ״ואָמַר הֲרֵי עָלַי כְּנִדְרֵי רְשָׁעִים אוֹ כִּנְדָבוֹת כְּשֵׁרִים שֶׁאֹכַל לְךָ אוֹ אִם אֹכַל לְךָ הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא פֵּרֵשׁ. אָמַר כְּנִדְרֵי כְּשֵׁרִים לֹא נִתְחַיֵּב בִּכְלוּם שֶׁאֵין הַכְּשֵׁרִים נוֹדְרִים בְּדֶרֶךְ אִסּוּר וָכַעַס. אָמַר כְּנִדְרֵי רְשָׁעִים הֲרֵינִי וְהָיָה נָזִיר עוֹבֵר לְפָנָיו חַיָּב בִּנְזִירוּת. כְּנִדְרֵי רְשָׁעִים עָלַי חַיָּב קָרְבָּן. כְּנִדְרֵי רְשָׁעִים שֶׁלֹּא אֹכַל מִמֶּנּוּ חַיָּב בִּשְׁבוּעָה:
26If one says: "Let it be considered for me like the vows of the wicked..." or "...like the pledges of the upright73In either case, his statement implies a binding commitment for the wicked make vows and the upright make pledges. that I will eat from your [property]," or "...if I eat from your property," he is forbidden [to do so], even if he did not make an explicit statement.74I.e., he did not explicitly attach his vow to a sacrifice. This is another example of "the handles of vows" mentioned above (Radbaz).If he said: "Like the vows of the upright," his statement is of no consequence, for the upright do not take vows to prohibit things out of anger. If he says: "I am like the vows of the wicked," and a nazirite was passing before him, he is obligated to observe a nazirite vow.75Since the nazirite was passing before him, we assume that this was his intent. If he says: "I am responsible, like the vows of the wicked," he is obligated to bring a sacrifice.76This applies even when an animal is not in his sight, for this appears to be his intent (Radbaz). "Like the vows of the wicked, I will not eat from it,"77I.e., a loaf of bread [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 206:4)]. he is liable for an oath.78I.e., if he partakes of the food, he is liable for taking a false sh'vuat bitui.
כ״זהַנּוֹדֵר בַּתּוֹרָה כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָמַר פֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ עָלַי כָּזוֹ לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם וְאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ שְׁאֵלָה לְחָכָם. אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הָיָה עַם הָאָרֶץ. כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ קַלּוּת רֹאשׁ בִּנְדָרִים:
27When a person takes a vow by the Torah, i.e., he says: "This produce is considered for me like this,"79I.e., a Torah scroll. his statements are of no consequence80For the holiness of a Torah scroll is inherent. It is not established by man's actions. and he need not ask a sage to release him from it.81See Chapter 4, Halachah 5, and Hilchot Sh'vuot, ch. 6, which describe this practice. [An exception is made if] he is a common person so that he will not act frivolously with regard to vows.82I.e., the vow is not binding. Nevertheless, we make it appear that it is and require him to seek to be released for the reason stated by the Rambam. See the parallels in Chapter 2, Halachot 12-13 and Hilchot Sh'vuot 12:4-5.
כ״חנָדַר בְּמַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בָּהּ הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר שֶׁהֲרֵי כָּתוּב בָּהּ אִסָּר וְנֶדֶר. נְטָלָהּ בְּיָדוֹ וְנָדַר בָּהּ הֲרֵי זֶה כְּמִי שֶׁנָּדַר בְּמַה שֶּׁכָּתוּב בָּהּ:
28If one took a vow by what was written in [the Torah], he is forbidden [to partake of the article mentioned in his vow], for [the Torah] contains statements involving prohibitions and vows.83The Rambam's explanation is based on the Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 1:3). With regard to oaths, by contrast, his intent is focused on God's name. If he took it in his arm and took an oath on it, it is as if he took a vow by what was written in it.84Since he knows what is written in the Torah and is holding it in a reverent manner, we assume that he is not making his statements in vain. Hence, we interpret them as referring to an option for which he would be liable.
כ״טהָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ נַשְׁכִּים וְנִשְׁנֶה פֶּרֶק. עָלָיו לְהַשְׁכִּים וְלִקְרוֹת שֶׁזֶּה כְּמוֹ נֵדֶר הוּא וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הוֹצִיאוֹ בִּלְשׁוֹן נֵדֶר:
29When a person tells a colleague: "Let's get up and study a chapter [of Torah]," he is obligated to get up and study.85Nedarim 8a derives this concept from Ezekiel 3:22-23 which states: "And He said to me: "Arise and go out to the valley and there I will speak to you. I arose and I went out to the valley and there the glory of God was standing." Since God promised to reveal Himself to Ezekiel, He kept his word, appearing even before Ezekiel arrived there. Even though he did not use the wording of a vow, this is comparable to a vow.86From Nedarim 8a, it appears that although this statement establishes a binding commitment, it does not have the full power of a vow. The Tur and the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 213:2) consider this statement as an actual vow.The Rambam's perspective appears to be that a vow involves making an object forbidden. This instance where the person accepts a commitment upon himself bears a closer resemblance to the obligation incurred when making an oath. Nevertheless, since the person did not employ the wording associated with an oath, it is not binding as an oath. Nonetheless, since a mitzvah is involved, a binding commitment is established.
ל׳הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ הֲרֵי אַתְּ עָלַי כְּאִמִּי אוֹ כַּאֲחוֹתִי אוֹ כְּעָרְלָה אוֹ כְּכִלְאֵי הַכֶּרֶם הֲרֵי זֶה כְּאוֹמֵר עַל הַפֵּרוֹת הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ כִּבְשַׂר חֲזִיר. כְּשֵׁם שֶׁהוּא מֻתָּר לְאָכְלָן כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ כָּךְ מֻתָּר בְּאִשְׁתּוֹ. אֲבָל אִם אָמַר לָהּ הֲרֵינִי מֻדָּר מִמֵךְ הֲנָיָה אוֹ הֲנָאַת תַּשְׁמִישֵׁךְ אֲסוּרָה עָלַי הֲרֵי זוֹ אֲסוּרָה עָלָיו כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר:
30When a person tells his wife: "You are considered to me as my mother," "...as my sister,"87With whom it is forbidden for him to engage in relations. "...as orlah," or "...as mixed species in a vineyard,"88Of which it is forbidden to partake. See Leviticus 19:23, Deuteronomy 22:9. it is as if one says concerning produce: "May it be like pig meat." Just as he is permitted to partake of that produce, as explained,89Halachot 8-9. See also Chapter 2, Halachah 13. so, too, he is permitted [to engage in relations] with his wife.If, however, he tells her: "I am taking a vow, forbidding all pleasure from you"90A man is obligated to give his wife conjugal rights. Hence, he is not allowed to forbid himself from engaging in relations with her. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the vow also involves satisfaction that he could forbid him, it also includes this form of satisfaction.or "The pleasure of relations with you is forbidden to me," she is forbidden to him, as will be explained.91For he did not forbid relations, but instead, the satisfaction relations bring him. See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.
ב׳
א׳אֶחָד הַנּוֹדֵר מִפִּי עַצְמוֹ אוֹ שֶׁהִדִּירוֹ חֲבֵרוֹ וְאָמַר אָמֵן אוֹ דָּבָר שֶׁעִנְיָנוֹ כְּעִנְיַן אָמֵן שֶׁהוּא קַבָּלַת דְּבָרִים:
1[The same laws apply] whether one took the vow on his own [volition] or another person states a vow for him and he answers Amen or says something which like Amen implies that he accepts the matter.1See the parallels in Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:1.
ב׳וְאֵין הַנּוֹדֵר נֶאֱסָר בְּדָבָר שֶׁאָסַר עַל עַצְמוֹ עַד שֶׁיּוֹצִיא בִּשְׂפָתָיו וְיִהְיֶה פִּיו וְלִבּוֹ שָׁוִין כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ בִּשְׁבוּעוֹת. אֲבָל הַמִּתְכַּוֵּן לִנְדֹּר בְּנָזִיר וְנָדַר בְּקָרְבָּן. בְּקָרְבָּן וְנָדַר בְּנָזִיר. בִּשְׁבוּעָה וְנָדַר. אוֹ שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לִנְדֹּר וְנִשְׁבַּע. אוֹ שֶׁנִּתְכַּוֵּן לוֹמַר תְּאֵנִים וְאָמַר עֲנָבִים. הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר בִּשְׁנֵיהֶם וְאֵין כָּאן נֵדֶר:
2A person who takes an oath is not forbidden [to partake of] the entity which he forbade to himself until he makes a verbal statement to that effect2I.e., mere thought is not sufficient. With regard to vows, Numbers 30:7 mentions "the expression of her lips," implying that one must express his intent verbally. and his statements must match his intent, as we explained with regard to oaths.3Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:10-12. The latter point is also implied by the prooftext cited above, for the term "expression" implies bringing out something which exists, i.e., revealing one's thoughts. Thus if a statement does not match one's thoughts, it is not an "expression" (Kiryat Sefer).If, by contrast, one intended to take a nazirite vow and instead, vowed to bring a sacrifice, [intended to vow to bring] a sacrifice and instead, took a nazirite [vow], [intended to take] an oath and instead, [took] a vow, [intended to take] a vow and instead, [took] an oath, intended to say "figs" and instead, said "grapes," both are permitted to him.4The figs, because he did not make a statement concerning them and the grapes, because he did not intend to mention them. There is no vow.
ג׳הַנּוֹדֵר עַל דַּעַת אֲחֵרִים הֲרֵי זֶה כְּנִשְׁבָּע עַל דַּעַת אֲחֵרִים. וְכֵן הַנּוֹדֵר וְחָזַר בּוֹ בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִּבּוּר אוֹ שֶׁמִּחוּ בּוֹ בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִּבּוּר וְקִבֵּל הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. וְדִין כָּל אֵלּוּ הַדְּבָרִים בִּנְדָרִים כְּדִינָן בִּשְׁבוּעוֹת:
3When a person takes a vow dependent on the intent of others, it is like he took an oath dependent on the intent of others.5See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:15. Similarly, if one takes a vow and retracts6He must state his retraction verbally. It is not sufficient for him to have this intent in his heart [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 210:3)]. immediately thereafter or someone rebuked him immediately thereafter and he accepted their statement, he is permitted [to use the article mentioned].7See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17-18. As mentioned there, the term "immediately thereafter" has a specific halachic definition: the time it takes a student to tell his teacher: Shalom Elecha Rabbi. Since he retracts in this short time, it is considered as if the vow was never made. The laws applying to all these matters with regard to vows are the same as those applying to oaths.8For Numbers 30:3 associates the two together (Kessef Mishneh). See Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 239:1).
ד׳מִי שֶׁהִתְנָה קֹדֶם שֶׁיִּדֹּר וְאָמַר כָּל נֵדֶר שֶׁאֶדֹּר מִכָּאן וְעַד עֶשֶׂר שָׁנִים הֲרֵינִי חוֹזֵר בָּהֶן אוֹ הֲרֵי הֵן בְּטֵלִים וְכַיּוֹצֵא בַּדְּבָרִים אֵלּוּ וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָדַר. אִם הָיָה זוֹכֵר הַתְּנַאי בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁנָּדַר הֲרֵי נִדְרוֹ קַיָּם שֶׁהֲרֵי בִּטֵּל הַתְּנַאי בְּנֵדֶר זֶה. וְאִם לֹא זָכַר הַתְּנַאי אֶלָּא אַחַר שֶׁנָּדַר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁקִּבֵּל הַתְּנַאי בְּלִבּוֹ וְקִיְּמוֹ הֲרֵי הַנֵּדֶר בָּטֵל. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הוֹצִיא עַתָּה הַחֲזָרָה בְּפִיו כְּבָר הִקְדִּים הַחֲזָרָה לַנֵּדֶר וְהוֹצִיאָהּ בְּפִיו מִקֹּדֶם. וְיֵשׁ שֶׁמּוֹרֶה לְהַחְמִיר וְאוֹמֵר וְהוּא שֶׁיִּזְכֹּר הַתְּנַאי אַחַר שֶׁנָּדַר בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִּבּוּר:
4[The following laws apply when] a person issued a stipulation before he made a vow, saying: "I am retracting from any vow that I will take from now until ten years in the future," "They are nullified," or other similar statements, and then took a vow: If he remembered the stipulation at the time he made the vow, the vow is effective, for by taking the vow, he nullified the stipulation.9For by taking the vow, he is indicating that he no longer desires to uphold the stipulation (see Nedarim 23b). If, however, he did not remember the stipulation until after he made the vow, the vow is nullified10Kiryat Sefer explains this ruling as follows: Although Numbers 30:3 states: "He shall not desecrate his word," that applies only to a vow that has taken effect. In this instance, since he forgot his stipulation, it is as if he took the vow in error and it never took effect. even if [immediately after taking the vow], he brought the stipulation to mind and maintained it. Although he did not verbalize his retraction at the time [he made the vow], the retraction preceded the vow and he verbalized it beforehand.11Our translation and bracketed additions are made on the basis of the gloss of the Radbaz. There is an authority who rules stringently and says that he must remember the stipulation immediately thereafter taking the vow.12Otherwise, according to that view, the vow takes effect and the fact that he remembers the stipulation afterwards is not significant. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:2) mentions the Rambam's view, but also that of the other authority and states that we should give weight to that authority's view. The Ra'avad also differs with the Rambam and offers another interpretation, stating that the nullification is only effective when he willingly accepts the stipulation immediately after remembering it.As Nedarim, loc. cit., emphasizes, the most common application of this principle is the declaration customarily made after the release of vows on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah, when we nullify all the vows we will take in the year to come. This is also the source for the Kol Nidrei prayer recited at the beginning of Yom Kippur which nullifies all vows to be taken in the coming year. Note, however, the statement of Rama (Yoreh De'ah 211:1) that we do not rely on this stipulation without going to a sage for a formal annulment of a vow unless a great necessity was involved.
ה׳מִי שֶׁהִקְדִּים אֶת הַתְּנַאי לְשָׁנָה אוֹ לְעֶשֶׂר וְאַחַר כָּךְ נָדַר וְנִזְכַּר בְּשָׁעָה שֶׁנָּדַר שֶׁיֵּשׁ לוֹ תְּנַאי וְשָׁכַח עַל אֵי זֶה דָּבָר הִתְנָה וְכֵיצַד הָיָה הַתְּנַאי. אִם אָמַר עַל דַּעַת רִאשׁוֹנָה אֲנִי עוֹשֶׂה אֵין נִדְרוֹ נֵדֶר שֶׁהֲרֵי בִּטְּלוֹ. וְאִם לֹא אָמַר עַל דַּעַת רִאשׁוֹנָה אֲנִי עוֹשֶׂה כְּבָר בִּטֵּל הַתְּנַאי וְקִיֵּם הַנֵּדֶר שֶׁהֲרֵי זָכַר בִּשְׁעַת הַנֵּדֶר שֶׁיֵּשׁ שָׁם תְּנַאי וְאַף עַל פִּי כֵן נָדַר:
5[The following rules apply when] one made a stipulation [similar to that mentioned above]13In this instance, he did not nullify all vows that he would make in the future, only those of a certain type, e.g., not to drink wine or eat meat [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:3)]. for a year or for ten years and afterwards took a vow, remembering at the time that he took the vow that he had made a stipulation, but forgetting the subject of that stipulation or what it involved. If [when taking the vow], he said:14In one of his response, the Radbaz states that this intent need not be verbalized. It is sufficient that he have the intent at heart. "I am acting according to my original intention,"15I.e., his intent is that if his original statement is discovered to run contrary to his vow, he desires to follow his original statement. his vow is not effective, for he has nullified it. If he does not make such a statement, he has nullified the stipulation and upheld the vow, for, at the time he took the vow, he remembered that there was a stipulation and, nevertheless, took the vow.16I.e., he was aware of the possibility that his vow could run contrary to his original statement and took it nonetheless.
ו׳יֵשׁ מֵהַגְּאוֹנִים שֶׁאוֹמְרִים אֵין כָּל אֵלּוּ הַדְּבָרִים נוֹהֲגִין אֶלָּא בִּנְדָרִים בִּלְבַד לֹא בִּשְׁבוּעוֹת. וְיֵשׁ מִי שֶׁמּוֹרֶה שֶׁדִּין הַנְּדָרִים וְהַשְּׁבוּעוֹת בְּעִנְיָנוֹת אֵלּוּ אֶחָד הֵם. וְכִי יֵשׁ לוֹ לְהַקְדִּים תְּנַאי לִשְׁבוּעָתוֹ כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁאָמְרוּ בִּנְדָרִים:
6There are some of the Geonim who maintain that all of these statements are applicable only with regard to vows and not to oaths,17For oaths have a more severe dimension, since God's name must be invoked. (See Hilchot Sh'vuot 12:2.) The Jerusalem Talmud (Nedarim 3:1) would appear to support this approach. but there is an authority who maintains that the laws pertaining to vows and oaths are the same in this regard. Thus one may issue a stipulation nullifying an oath [beforehand] in the same manner as was stated with regard to vows.18The Radbaz maintains that the Rambam follows this view as evidenced by the fact that he does not include this in the list of matters in which oaths differ from vows (Chapter 3, Halachah 1). The text for the nullification of vows rite recited on the day preceding Rosh HaShanah and the Kol Nidrei prayer mention oaths as well as vows.The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 211:4) adds that the nullification of vows in this manner is possible only when one takes a vow on his own initiative, but not when he agrees to a vow proposed by a colleague, for the colleague does not have that person's original stipulation in mind. Thus by agreeing to his colleague's statement, he implies that he is not concerned with his original stipulation.
ז׳סְתָם נְדָרִים לְהַחְמִיר. וּפֵרוּשָׁן יֵשׁ בּוֹ לְהָקֵל וּלְהַחְמִיר. כֵּיצַד. הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי הַפֵּרוֹת הָאֵלּוּ עָלַי כְּבָשָׂר מָלִיחַ וּכְיֵין נֶסֶךְ. אוֹמְרִין לוֹ וּמֶה הָיָה בְּלִבְּךָ. אִם פֵּרֵשׁ וְאָמַר כְּבָשָׂר מָלִיחַ שֶׁל קָרְבָּן וּכְיַיִן שֶׁנִּתְנַסֵּךְ עַל הַמִּזְבֵּחַ הָיָה בְּלִבִּי הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר. וְאִם אָמַר לֹא הָיָה בְּלִבִּי אֶלָּא תִּקְרֹבֶת עַכּוּ"ם וְיַיִן שֶׁנִּתְנַסֵּךְ לָהּ הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. וְאִם נָדַר סְתָם הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר:
7[When a person takes] a vow whose object is not clear,19I.e., he does not know with regard to which prohibition he associated his vow (Rashi, Nedarim 18b). we rule stringently.20We say that he associated the vow with an object that causes entities to be forbidden (ibid.). The rationale is that if this was not his intent, he should have remained silent (Radbaz). See also Chapter 9, Halachah 4. If he interprets them, there is room for both leniency and stringency.What does this imply? If one says: "Let this produce be considered as salted meat and as wine poured as a libation for me," we ask him what his intent was. If he explained himself, saying "My intent was that salted meat refers to sacrificial meat21For it was necessary to salt all the sacrifices (Leviticus 2:13 . and wine poured as a libation refers to libations poured on the Temple altar," he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].22For when one equates produce with a sacrifice the vow is binding (Chapter 1, Halachot 7, 9). If, however, he says: "My intent was a sacrifice offered to a false deity23For the gentiles would also salt their offerings. and wine poured as a libation to it," he is permitted.24For there is no way, he can cause an article to be forbidden as a sacrifice to a false deity through his vow. Hence, when he mentions such an object as the basis of a vow, the vow is not effective (Chapter 1, Halachot 8, 9). If he took the vow without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
ח׳וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי הַפֵּרוֹת הָאֵלּוּ עָלַי חֵרֶם. אִם כְּחֵרֶם שֶׁל בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת אָסוּר. וְאִם כְּחֶרְמֵי הַכֹּהֲנִים מֻתָּר. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֵן מָמוֹן שֶׁלָּהֶם וְאֵין בָּהּ אִסּוּר. וְאִם סְתָם אָסוּר:
8Similar principles apply when one says: "This produce is considered as cherem (a dedication offering) for me." If [his intent was] a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple, he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].25For in such an instance, the articles dedicated to the upkeep of the Temple become consecrated and forbidden for ordinary use until they are redeemed. If [his intent] was a dedication offering for the priests, he is permitted, because [these offerings] become [the priests'] personal possessions and are not forbidden [to others].26Hence an entity that is made equivalent to them is likewise not forbidden. If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
ט׳הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי כְּמַעֲשֵׂר. אִם כְּמַעֲשַׂר בְּהֵמָה אָסוּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא קָרְבָּן שֶׁהִקְדִּישׁוֹ בְּיָדוֹ כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. וְאִם כְּמַעֲשַׂר דָּגָן מֻתָּר וְאִם סְתָם אָסוּר:
9[If he states:] "May they be considered like the tithes for me," [we investigate his intent. If his intent was] the tithe taken from animals, [it becomes] forbidden, because these are sacrifices that he consecrates through his actions, as we explained.27Chapter 1, Halachah 13. [If his intent was] the tithe taken from grain, it is permitted.28For the tithe taken from grain is not forbidden to be eaten by ordinary people. Moreover, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir who rules that ordinary people may not partake of these tithes, they are not forbidden due to a vow. Instead, it was forbidden to partake of the grain before they were separated and once, they were separated, they remain forbidden (Ritba, Nedarim 18b). If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden.
י׳הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי כִּתְרוּמָה. אִם לִתְרוּמַת הַלִּשְׁכָּה נִתְכַּוֵּן הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר. וְאִם לִתְרוּמַת הַגֹּרֶן נִתְכַּוֵּן מֻתָּר. וְאִם סְתָם אָסוּר. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
10[If he states:] "May they be considered like terumah for me," [we investigate his intent. If his intent was] the money donated for the sacrificial offerings,29Terumat halishkah in Hebrew. See Hilchot Shekalim, ch. 2, which describes how these funds were collected and used. it is forbidden. If his intent was terumah [separated from] the grain heap, it is permitted.30See Chapter 1, Halachah 11. If [he took the vow] without a specific intent, he is forbidden. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
י״אבַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁמַּשְׁמָע כָּל אֶחָד מֵאֵלּוּ שָׁם שְׁנֵי עִנְיָנוֹת. אֲבָל מָקוֹם שֶׁדַּרְכָּן שֶׁאֵין קוֹרְאִים חֵרֶם סְתָם אֶלָּא לְחֶרְמֵי בֶּדֶק הַבַּיִת בִּלְבַד וְאָמַר שָׁם הֲרֵי הֵן עָלַי חֵרֶם הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר. וְכֵן אִם הָיָה דַּרְכָּן שֶׁאֵין קוֹרְאִים חֵרֶם סְתָם אֶלָּא לְחֶרְמֵי כֹּהֲנִים הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה שֶׁאֵין הוֹלְכִין בִּנְדָרִים אֶלָּא אַחַר לְשׁוֹן אַנְשֵׁי אוֹתוֹ מָקוֹם בְּאוֹתוֹ זְמַן:
11When does the above31That we explore the person's intention. apply? In a place where the terms used have these two possible meanings. In a place where the term cherem without any further definition is used only to refer to the dedication offerings for the upkeep of the Temple,32Nedarim 18b explains that in the Galilee, it was not common for priests to live. Hence, when a person uses the term cherem there, his intent is a dedication offering for the upkeep of the Temple. if he says: "[This produce is considered] as cherem for me," he is forbidden [to partake of the produce].33For we assume that his intent was a dedication offering to the Temple, even if he says that his intent was an offering to the priests. Similarly, if their custom was to use the term cherem without any further definition to refer only to dedication offerings given the priests, he is permitted. Similar concepts apply in all analogous situations, for with regard to vows, we follow the connotations understood by the people in that place in that era.34See Chapter 9, Halachah 1.
י״בהַנּוֹדֵר בְּחֵרֶם וְאָמַר לֹא הָיָה בְּלִבִּי אֶלָּא חֶרְמוֹ שֶׁל יָם שֶׁהִיא הַמִּכְמֹרֶת. נָדַר בְּקָרְבָּן וְאָמַר לֹא הָיָה בְּלִבִּי אֶלָּא בְּקָרְבְּנוֹת מְלָכִים. אָמַר לַחֲבֵרוֹ הֲרֵי עַצְמִי עָלֶיךָ קָרְבָּן וְאָמַר לֹא הָיָה בְּלִבִּי אֶלָּא לְאָסְרוֹ בְּעֶצֶם שֶׁהִנַּחְתִּי לִי לִהְיוֹת נוֹדֵר בּוֹ דֶּרֶךְ שְׂחוֹק. נָדַר שֶׁלֹּא תֵּהָנֶה לוֹ אִשְׁתּוֹ וְאָמַר לֹא הָיָה בְּלִבִּי אֶלָּא אִשְׁתִּי רִאשׁוֹנָה שֶׁגֵּרַשְׁתִּיהָ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בְּאֵלּוּ הַדְּבָרִים שֶׁמַּשְׁמָעָן לְכָל הָעָם אִסּוּר וְהוּא אוֹמֵר לֹא נִתְכַּוַּנְתִּי אֶלָּא לְכָךְ וּלְכָךְ. אִם הָיָה הַנּוֹדֵר תַּלְמִיד חָכָם הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר וְאֵין צָרִיךְ שְׁאֵלָה לְחָכָם. וְאִם הָיָה עַם הָאָרֶץ מַרְאִין בְּעֵינָיו שֶׁזֶּה נֵדֶר וְשֶׁהוּא אָסוּר וּפוֹתְחִים לוֹ פֶּתַח מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר וּמַתִּירִין לוֹ. וּבֵין שֶׁהָיָה תַּלְמִיד חָכָם אוֹ עַם הָאָרֶץ גּוֹעֲרִין בָּהֶן וּמְלַמְּדִין אוֹתָן שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ מִנְהָג זֶה בִּנְדָרִים וְלֹא יִהְיוּ נוֹדְרִין דֶּרֶךְ שְׂחוֹק וְהִתּוּל:
12[The ensuing rules apply] in all situations analogous to those exemplified: i.e., situations when a person takes a vow which appears to everyone to involve a prohibition, but he says: "My intent was for this and this specific instance,"35I.e., a situation where the basis for the vow is a permitted entity and hence, the vow does not take effect. for example, he takes a vow based on a cherem,36I.e., he said: "Let this produce be like a cherem." but [afterwards] said: "My intent was a sea cherem, i.e., a fishing net,"37In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 2:8), the Rambam cites Chabakuk 1:15 which employs such a term. he took a vow based on an offering, but said: "My intent was an offering brought to the king," He told a colleague: "Myself is like a sacrifice for you," and then explained: "My intent was only to forbid him from [benefiting from] a bone38The Hebrew word atzmi means "myself," but it can also mean "my bone." Initially, it was thought that the person's intent was that he forbade his colleague from benefiting from his self. He clarified, however, that his intent was "his bone." that I set aside so that I could take a vow as a lark," he took a vow that his wife could not benefit from him and then explained that his intent was his first wife whom he had divorced.[In all the above situations,] if the person who took the vow was a Torah scholar, he is permitted and he need not ask a sage [for the vow to be released].39His word can be accepted when he says: "This was my intent." Hence, the vow is not effective at all. With regard to the release of vows, see Chapter 4, Halachah 5. If the one who took the vow is a common person, we make it appear to him that it is a vow, yet we give him an opportunity to ask for its release from another vantage point and then release the vow.40I.e., as stated in the following halachah, this is a safeguard to insure that the common people treat vows with the earnestness required. Whether he is a Torah scholar or a common person, we rebuke him and teach him not to conduct himself in this manner with regard to vows and not to take vows as a lark or a caper.
י״גוְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ הֲרֵי אַתְּ עָלַי כְּאִמִּי אוֹ הָאוֹמֵר פֵּרוֹת אֵלּוּ עָלַי כִּבְשַׂר חֲזִיר שֶׁאֵין כָּאן נֵדֶר כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. אִם הָיָה הָאוֹמֵר תַּלְמִיד חָכָם אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ שְׁאֵלָה לְחָכָם. וְאִם הָיָה עַם הָאָרֶץ צָרִיךְ שְׁאֵלָה לְחָכָם וּמַרְאִין בְּעֵינָיו שֶׁאִשְׁתּוֹ אֲסוּרָה וְשֶׁאוֹתָן הַפֵּרוֹת אֲסוּרִין וּפוֹתְחִין לוֹ פֶּתַח מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר וּמַתִּירִין לוֹ נִדְרוֹ כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ קַלּוּת רֹאשׁ בִּנְדָרִים:
13Similarly, when a person tells his wife: "You are considered as my mother to me," or he says: "Let this produce be considered as pig meat for me," the vow is not effective, as we explained.41Chapter 1, Halachah 30. If the person who took the vow was a Torah scholar, he is permitted and he need not ask a sage [for the vow to be released].42For we assume he knows that the vow is of no consequence. Note the Rama (Yoreh De'ah 205:1) who states that in the present age, we consider everyone as a common person with regard to such matters. If the one who took the vow is a common person, he must ask a sage [for the vow to be released]. We make it appear to him that his wife is forbidden to him and that the produce is forbidden,43The Rama (loc. cit.) states that the person is required to approach a sage only with regard to vows involving his wife, but not with regard to those involving other matters. but we give him an opportunity to ask for its release from another vantage point and then release the vow in order that people not act frivolously with regard to vows.44If the common person was allowed not to pay heed to his vow, he might take leniency with regard to other vows in the future, including some which would be halachically binding.
י״דהַהֶפְקֵר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ נֵדֶר הֲרֵי הוּא כְּמוֹ נֵדֶר שֶׁאָסוּר לוֹ לַחְזֹר בּוֹ. וּמַה הוּא הַהֶפְקֵר הוּא שֶׁיֹּאמַר אָדָם נְכָסִים אֵלּוּ הֶפְקֵר לַכּל. בֵּין בְּמִטַּלְטְלִין בֵּין בְּקַרְקָעוֹת. וְכֵיצַד דִּין הַהֶפְקֵר. כָּל הַקּוֹדֵם וְזָכָה בּוֹ קָנָהוּ לְעַצְמוֹ וְנַעֲשָׂה שֶׁלּוֹ. וַאֲפִלּוּ זֶה שֶׁהִפְקִיר דִּינוֹ בּוֹ כְּדִין כָּל אָדָם אִם קָדַם וְזָכָה בּוֹ קָנָהוּ:
14Although declaring property ownerless is not a vow,45This implies that he does not have the potential to retract merely by making a statement (Radbaz, Ketzot HaChoshen 273:1). According to Rabbinic decree, the laws are more stringent with regard to landed property, but this is law in all other instances.Ketzot HaChoshen discusses whether declaring an object ownerless is merely a retraction of one's own ownership over or does it involve transferring ownership to the person who will ultimately acquire it.The Jerusalem Talmud (Pe'ah 6:1) explains that the declaration of property as ownerless is derived from the laws of the Sabbatical Year. In the Sabbatical year, this is done by Divine decree and here, by contrast, man declares the property ownerless. it resembles a vow, for the person is forbidden to retract.What is meant by declaring property ownerless? A person says: "This property is free for everyone"46Both the rich and the poor (Nedarim 7a). See the following halachah. to acquire. It applies to both movable property and landed property.What is the law [applying to property] declared ownerless? Whoever comes first and acquires it,47Through a formal act of acquisition (kinyan) as stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 2:1. See Halachah 19. becomes the owner. He acquires it as his own and it becomes his. Even the person who declared the property ownerless has the same rights as others with regard to it. If he comes first and acquires it, it becomes his.48I.e., it is not like consecrated property for him (Radbaz).See Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27 which states that in this way, a person frees himself from the obligation to tithe the crops of his field.
ט״והַמַּפְקִיר לַעֲנִיִּים אֲבָל לֹא לַעֲשִׁירִים אֵינוֹ הֶפְקֵר עַד שֶׁיַּפְקִיר לַכּל כִּשְׁמִטָּה. והַמַּפְקִיר עֲבָדָיו הַגְּדוֹלִים קָנוּ עַצְמָן. וְהַקְּטַנִּים כָּל הַקּוֹדֵם וְהֶחֱזִיק בָּהֶן זָכָה כִּשְׁאָר הַמִּטַּלְטְלִין:
15When a person declares his property ownerless [so that it can be acquired by] the poor, but not by the rich, it is not ownerless.49This is one of the indications that this declaration is not a vow. For were it a vow, it could be given to the poor alone (Jerusalem Talmud, loc. cit.). He must declare it ownerless for everyone like the produce of the Sabbatical year.When a person declares his servants ownerless, those past majority acquire themselves.50I.e., are set free. Since they are released from their owner's property, they are free to be acquired by anyone and so they acquire themselves. Nevertheless, although the servant becomes his own man at this time, before he becomes a full-fledged member of the Jewish people, he must be given a bill of freedom (Hilchot Avadim 8:13). With regard to those below majority, whoever comes first and takes hold of them acquires them as is the law with regard to other movable property.51Since they are below majority, they do not have an independent financial capacity and hence, cannot acquire themselves. Therefore any other person can acquire them.
ט״זהַמַּפְקִיר אֶת הַקַּרְקַע כָּל הַקּוֹדֵם וְהֶחֱזִיק בָּהּ זָכָה. דִּין תּוֹרָה אֲפִלּוּ הִפְקִיר בִּפְנֵי אֶחָד הֲרֵי זֶה הֶפְקֵר וְנִפְטָר מִן הַמַּעַשְׂרוֹת כְּמוֹ שֶׁיִּתְבָּאֵר בִּמְקוֹמוֹ. אֲבָל מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים אֵינוֹ הֶפְקֵר עַד שֶׁיַּפְקִיר בִּפְנֵי שְׁלֹשָׁה כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּהְיֶה אֶחָד זוֹכֶה אִם רָצָה וְהַשְּׁנַיִם מְעִידִים. וְהָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי זֶה הֶפְקֵר וְזֶה. הֲרֵי הַשֵּׁנִי סְפֵק הֶפְקֵר וְאִם אָמַר וְזֶה כְּמוֹ זֶה אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר וְגַם זֶה הֲרֵי הִתְפִּיס הַשֵּׁנִי וְיִהְיֶה הֶפְקֵר וַדַּאי:
16When a person declares landed property ownerless, whoever comes first and manifests his ownership52Through a formal kinyan, e.g., locking a door or erecting a fence. over it acquires it.According to Scriptural Law, even when a person declares his property ownerless in the presence of one person, it becomes ownerless and one is not required to tithe its produce,53Rabbenu Asher and the Rama (Choshen Mishpat 273:7) states that even when one declares property ownerless without anyone else being present, the declaration is binding according to Scriptural Law. as will be explained in its place.54See Hilchot Terumah 2:11; Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 5:27. Tithes are only required to be given from crops that one grew as one's own, not those acquired from ownerless property. According to Rabbinic decree, however, [property] is not ownerless until one declares as such in the presence of three people so that one can acquire it and two can act as witnesses.Should one say: "This is ownerless and this," there is an unresolved doubt whether the second entity is ownerless.55Nedarim 7b raises the question, but does not resolve it. Hence, if the original owner desires to retain possession, we do not expropriate it from him (Sefer Meirat Einayim 273:12). If he said: "...and this is like this" or "...and also this," he has associated the second entity [with the first], and it is definitely ownerless.
י״זהַמַּפְקִיר אֶת שָׂדֵהוּ וְלֹא זָכָה בָּהּ אָדָם כָּל שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר בּוֹ. אַחַר שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר בּוֹ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן קָדַם וְזָכָה בָּהּ הֲרֵי הוּא כְּזוֹכֶה מִן הַהֶפְקֵר בֵּין הוּא בֵּין אַחֵר:
17When a person declares his field ownerless and no one else acquires it,56If, however, another person acquires, it becomes that person's property. The original owner may not retract his declaration (Kessef Mishneh). during the first three days, he may retract.57According to Scriptural Law and even according to Rabbinic Law with regard to other property, when one declares his property ownerless, the declaration takes effect from the first day and he is forbidden to retract, as stated in Halachah 14. Nevertheless, if he does retract, the retraction is binding. After these three days, he may not retract unless he comes first and acquires it.58Our Sages, however, ordained this ruling as a safeguard against people declaring their fields ownerless and then retaking possession of them and in this way, freeing themselves from the responsibility of separating the tithes (Radbaz, Sefer Meirat Einayim 273:13). He is like one acquiring ownerless property.59And thus he is not liable to separate the tithes (Kessef Mishneh). [There is no difference] between him and another person.
י״חהָאוֹמֵר שָׂדֶה זוֹ מֻפְקֶרֶת לְיוֹם אֶחָד לְשַׁבָּת אַחַת לְחֹדֶשׁ אֶחָד לְשָׁנָה אַחַת לְשָׁבוּעַ אֶחָד עַד שֶׁלֹּא זָכָה בָּהּ הוּא אוֹ אַחֵר יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר בּוֹ. וּמִשֶּׁזָּכָה בָּהּ בֵּין הוּא בֵּין אַחֵר אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לַחְזֹר בּוֹ. וּמִפְּנֵי מָה יֵשׁ לוֹ לַחְזֹר כָּאן עַד שֶׁיִּזְכּוּ בָּהּ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁזֶּה דָּבָר שֶׁאֵינוֹ מָצוּי הוּא שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מַפְקִיר לִזְמַן קָצוּב:
18When a person says: "This field is declared ownerless for one day," "...for one week," "...for one month," "...for one year," or "...for one seven-year cycle," he may retract before he or another person acquires it.60I.e., even after three days pass. Since he is not intending to give up ownership entirely, even during the time he is willing to give up ownership, he still has a connection to the article and thus may withdraw his declaration (Radbaz). Once it is acquired, whether by the person himself or by someone else, he may not retract.Why does he have the right to retract before it was acquired? Because this is an uncommon matter. [Generally,] a person will not declare [property] ownerless for a limited time.
י״טדָּבָר הַמֻּפְקָר שֶׁבָּא אֶחָד וּשְׁמָרוֹ וְהָיָה מַבִּיט בּוֹ שֶׁלֹּא יִטְּלֶנּוּ אָדָם לֹא קָנָהוּ בְּהַבָּטָה אֶלָּא עַד שֶׁיַּגְבִּיהוֹ אִם הָיָה מִטַּלְטְלִין אוֹ יַחֲזִיק בַּקַּרְקַע כְּדֶרֶךְ שֶׁקּוֹנִין הַלָּקוֹחוֹת:
19When a person comes and watches over ownerless property, looking at it so that another person will not take it, he does not acquire it by looking at it. Instead, he must lift it up if it were movable property61Performing the kinyan of hagba'ah. Similarly, other kinyanim are also effective. or manifest ownership over it if it were landed property,62Performing the kinyan of chazzakah. as purchasers acquire property.63See Hilchot Mechirah 1:3, 3:1.
ג׳
א׳אַרְבָּעָה דְּבָרִים יֵשׁ בֵּין נְדָרִים לִשְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי. שֶׁבִּשְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי אֵין שְׁבוּעָה חָלָה עַל שְׁבוּעָה. וּבִנְדָרִים יָחוּל נֵדֶר עַל נֵדֶר. הַמַּתְפִּיס בִּשְׁבוּעָה פָּטוּר וּבִנְדָרִים חַיָּב. אֵין שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי חָלָה אֶלָּא עַל דִּבְרֵי הָרְשׁוּת. וּנְדָרִים חָלוֹת עַל דִּבְרֵי מִצְוָה כְּדִבְרֵי הָרְשׁוּת. שְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי חָלָה עַל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ וְעַל דָּבָר שֶׁאֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ. וּנְדָרִים אֵינָן חָלִין אֶלָּא עַל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ:
1There are four differences between a vow and a sh'vuat bitui:a) With regard to a sh'vuat bitui, one oath cannot take effect while another is already in effect,1See Hilchot Sh'vuot 4:9-10. The reverse ruling with regard to vows is described in Halachah 2. and with regard to vows, a vow can take effect while another is already in effect.b) When one attempts to extend the scope of an oath taken previously, he is not liable,2See Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:8-9. The reverse rulings with regard to vows are described in Halachot 3-5. and with regard to vows, one is.c) A sh'vuat bitui can take effect only with regard to actions that are left to one's choice,3See Hilchot Sh'vuot 5:14-16. The reverse ruling with regard to vows is described in Halachot 6-9. while vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one's choice.d) A sh'vuat bitui can take effect with regard to an entity of substance and an entity that is not of substance, 4This concept can be explained as follows: As stated in Halachah 6, an oath creates a prohibition on the person taking the oath (the gavra), i.e., the article is essentially permitted, he has accepted a prohibition on himself not to partake of it. Hence, it is not significant whether the article is of substance or not. With regard to vows, by contrast, the article itself (the cheftzah) becomes forbidden. Hence, for that prohibition to take effect, the article must be of substance (Radbaz). See Halachah 10 for an illustration of how this principle is effective with regard to vows. while vows take effect only with regards to entities of substance.
ב׳כֵּיצַד יָחוּל נֵדֶר עַל נֵדֶר. הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי עָלַי קָרְבָּן אִם אָכַלְתִּי כִּכָּר זוֹ. הֲרֵי עָלַי קָרְבָּן אִם אֹכָלֶנָּה וַאֲכָלָהּ חַיָּב עַל כָּל אַחַת וְאַחַת. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
2What is meant by the statement that a vow can take effect while another is already in effect? If a person says: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat this loaf [of bread]," [repeats]: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat it," he is liable [to bring a sacrifice] for every vow that he takes. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
ג׳כֵּיצַד הַמַּתְפִּיס בִּנְדָרִים חַיָּב. שָׁמַע חֲבֵרוֹ שֶׁנָּדַר וְאָמַר וַאֲנִי כְּמוֹתְךָ בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִּבּוּר הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר בְּמַה שֶּׁנֶּאֱסַר בּוֹ חֲבֵרוֹ. שָׁמַע הַשְּׁלִישִׁי זֶה שֶׁאָמַר וַאֲנִי וְאָמַר וַאֲנִי אֲפִלּוּ הָיוּ מֵאָה וְכָל אֶחָד מֵהֶן אוֹמֵר וַאֲנִי בְּתוֹךְ כְּדֵי דִּבּוּרוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ הֲרֵי כֻּלָּן אֲסוּרִין:
3What is meant by the statement that one who extends the scope of a vow taken previously is liable? He heard his colleague take a vow and said: "And I am like you" immediately thereafter,5This term refers to a specific span of time, the time it takes to say: Shalom Elecha Rebbi (Hilchot Sh'vuot 2:17). he is forbidden [to partake of] the substance that his colleague deemed forbidden.6I.e., he is extending the scope of his colleague's vow, so that it includes not only his colleague, but he himself.Here also the concept can be explained according to the above difference. Since an oath involves an obligation on the person taking the oath (gavra), it cannot be extended to include another individual, for each person must take his own oath. With regard to a vow, by contrast, since the prohibition caused by the vow is associated with a substance (cheftzah), another person can also extend the prohibition to himself (Rabbenu Nissim). If a third person heard the second person say: "And I am like you," and he also said: "I am like you," [he is also forbidden]. Even if there are one hundred and each one says: "And I am like you" immediately thereafter the statements of the previous one," they are all forbidden.
ד׳וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר הַבָּשָׂר הַזֶּה עָלַי אָסוּר וְחָזַר וְאָמַר אֲפִלּוּ אַחַר כַּמָּה יָמִים וְהַפַּת הַזֹּאת כַּבָּשָׂר הַזֶּה הֲרֵי הַפַּת נִתְפְּשָׂה וְנֶאֶסְרָה. חָזַר וְאָמַר וּדְבַשׁ זֶה כַּפַּת הַזֹּאת וְיַיִן זֶה כִּדְבַשׁ זֶה אֲפִלּוּ הֵן מֵאָה כֻּלָּן אֲסוּרִין:
4Similarly, when one says: "This meat is considered forbidden to me,' and even after several days7In this instance, it is not necessary to make the statement immediately thereafter the first vow. Since the meat is visible before us, one can attach a vow to it. With regard to the previous halachah, by contrast, we are speaking about a subject that cannot be seen. Hence, unless the statements are made immediately after each other, there is no way we can be certain of the meaning of the statement: "And I am like you" (Radbaz). says: "This bread is like this meat," [the prohibition] is extended to the bread and it becomes forbidden. If afterwards, he said: "And this honey is like this bread, and this wine is like this honey," even if he mentions 100 [substances], they are all forbidden.
ה׳הֲרֵי שֶׁמֵּת אָבִיו אוֹ רַבּוֹ הַיּוֹם וְנָדַר שֶׁיָּצוּם אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם וְצָם. וּלְאַחַר שָׁנִים אָמַר הֲרֵי יוֹם זֶה עָלָיו כְּיוֹם שֶׁמֵּת בּוֹ אָבִיו אוֹ רַבּוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר לֶאֱכל בּוֹ כְּלוּם שֶׁהֲרֵי הִתְפִּיס יוֹם זֶה וַאֲסָרוֹ כַּיּוֹם הָאָסוּר לוֹ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בְּאֵלּוּ:
5[The following rules apply when a person's] father or teacher died on a particular day and he took a vow to fast that day8This is a common practice in many communities. and [actually] fasted.9If, however, he never fasted on that day, he cannot attach another day to this vow (Chazon Yechezkel). If after years passed, he said: "Let this day10I.e., any given day. be considered as the day on which my father - or my teacher - died," he is forbidden to eat on that day. For he attached this day [to his existing vow] and caused it to be forbidden as the day which is forbidden for him. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
ו׳כֵּיצַד חָלִים הַנְּדָרִים עַל דִּבְרֵי מִצְוָה כְּדִבְרֵי הָרְשׁוּת. הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי הַמַּצָּה בְּלֵילֵי הַפֶּסַח אֲסוּרָה עָלָיו. הֲרֵי יְשִׁיבַת הַסֻּכָּה בֶּחָג הַסֻּכּוֹת אֲסוּרָה עָלָיו וַהֲרֵי הַתְּפִלִּין אֲסוּרוֹת בִּנְטִילָה עָלָיו הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין עָלָיו. וְאִם אָכַל אוֹ יָשַׁב אוֹ נָטַל לוֹקֶה. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר בְּמִי שֶׁאָמַר הֲרֵי עָלַי קָרְבָּן אִם אֹכַל מַצָּה בְּלֵילֵי הַפֶּסַח שֶׁהוּא חַיָּב בְּקָרְבָּן. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:
6What is meant by the statement that vows take effect with regard to mitzvot as well as actions that are left to one's choice? When a person says: "Matzah is forbidden to me on Pesach night," "Dwelling in a sukkah on that holiday is forbidden to me," or "I am forbidden to take hold of tefillin," they are forbidden to him. If he ate matzah, dwelled in a sukkah, or took tefillin, he is liable for lashes.11For breaking his vow. The Rama (Yoreh De'ah 215:1) mentions a view that maintains that the person should be given corporal punishment for taking such a vow and should be compelled to ask to have the vow released. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Needless to say, one who says: "I am obligated to bring a sacrifice if I eat matzah on Pesach night," is obligated to bring a sacrifice.12For he can fulfill the mitzvah and bring the sacrifice (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Nedarim 2:2). Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.
ז׳וּמִפְּנֵי מָה נְדָרִים חָלִים עַל דִּבְרֵי מִצְוָה וּשְׁבוּעוֹת אֵין חָלוֹת עַל דִּבְרֵי מִצְוָה. שֶׁהַנִּשְׁבָּע אוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ עַל דָּבָר שֶׁנִּשְׁבַּע עָלָיו. וְהַנּוֹדֵר אוֹסֵר הַדָּבָר הַנָּדוּר עַל עַצְמוֹ. נִמְצָא הַנִּשְׁבָּע לְבַטֵּל מִצְוָה אוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ וּכְבָר עַצְמוֹ מֻשְׁבָּע מֵהַר סִינַי וְאֵין שְׁבוּעָה חָלָה עַל שְׁבוּעָה. וְהָאוֹסֵר דָּבָר זֶה בְּנֵדֶר זֶה הַדָּבָר הוּא שֶׁנֶּאֱסַר וְאוֹתוֹ הַדָּבָר אֵינוֹ מֻשְׁבָּע מֵהַר סִינַי:
7Why do vows take effect with regard to mitzvot and oaths do not take effect with regard to mitzvot? Because when a person takes an oath he forbids himself from [partaking of] the entity mentioned in the oath.13I.e., the prohibition involves the gavra, the person himself. It cannot take effect if he is already bound to act otherwise. When, by contrast, one takes a vow, he causes the entity mentioned in the vow to be forbidden to him.14I.e., the prohibition involves the cheftzah, the article. Once it is forbidden, it is forbidden to fulfill the mitzvah by partaking of it or using it, for a positive commandment does not supercede a negative commandment. It would be a mitzvah fulfilled through a transgression which is a forbidden act (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, loc. cit.). Thus when a person takes an oath to nullify a mitzvah, he is placing a prohibition upon himself and he is already bound by an oath [to observe that mitzvah] from Mount Sinai, and one oath does not take effect if another is already in effect. When, by contrast, a person causes an entity to be forbidden through a vow, the prohibition involves the entity itself and that entity is not under oath from Mount Sinai.
ח׳כְּשֶׁאַתָּה מִתְבּוֹנֵן בַּכָּתוּב תִּמְצָא שֶׁהַדְּבָרִים מַרְאִין כֵּן כְּמוֹ שֶׁקִּבְּלוּ חֲכָמִים מִפִּי הַשְּׁמוּעָה. שֶׁהֲרֵי אוֹמֵר בִּשְׁבוּעַת בִּטּוּי (ויקרא ה ד) "לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב" בְּדִבְרֵי הָרְשׁוּת כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. שֶׁיֹּאכַל וְיִשְׁתֶּה הַיּוֹם אוֹ שֶׁיָּצוּם וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן. וּבִנְדָרִים הוּא אוֹמֵר (במדבר ל ג) "כְּכָל הַיֹּצֵא מִפִּיו יַעֲשֶׂה" וְלֹא חִלֵּק בֵּין דִּבְרֵי מִצְוָה לְדִבְרֵי הָרְשׁוּת:
8When you contemplate [the wording of] the Torah, it appears that their interpretation matches the explanation which our Sages received according to the Oral Tradition. For with regard to a sh'vuat bitui, [Leviticus 5:4] states: "Whether he will do harm or do good," i.e., speaking about permitted activities as we explained,15Hilchot Sh'vuot 5:16. e.g., whether I will eat or drink today, whether I will fast, or the like. With regard to vows, by contrast, [Numbers 30:3] states: "He shall do everything uttered by his mouth," without differentiating between matters associated with mitzvot and those left to our own volition.
ט׳הַנּוֹדֵר שֶׁיָּצוּם בְּשַׁבָּת אוֹ בְּיוֹם טוֹב חַיָּב לָצוּם. שֶׁהַנְּדָרִים חָלִים עַל דִּבְרֵי מִצְוָה כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. וְכֵן הַנּוֹדֵר שֶׁיָּצוּם יוֹם רִאשׁוֹן אוֹ יוֹם שְׁלִישִׁי כָּל יָמָיו וּפָגַע בּוֹ יוֹם זֶה וַהֲרֵי הוּא יוֹם טוֹב אוֹ עֶרֶב יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים הֲרֵי זֶה חַיָּב לָצוּם וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ. פָּגַע בּוֹ חֲנֻכָּה וּפוּרִים יִדָּחֶה נִדְרוֹ מִפְּנֵי הַיָּמִים הָאֵלּוּ הוֹאִיל וְאִסּוּר הַצּוֹם בָּהֶם מִדִּבְרֵי סוֹפְרִים הֲרֵי הֵן צְרִיכִין חִזּוּק וְיִדָּחֶה נִדְרוֹ מִפְּנֵי גְּזֵרַת חֲכָמִים:
9When a person takes a vow to fast on the Sabbath or a festival, he is obligated to fast16Despite the fact that by doing so he negates the mitzvah of taking pleasure in the Sabbath and festivals. The Ra'avad clarifies that the matter is dependent on the wording he used in his oath. If on the Sabbath, he said: "I will fast today," he is forbidden to keep his vow. for vows take effect even when they involve [the nullification of] a mitzvah as explained.17In the three preceding halachot. Similarly, if a person takes an oath to fast every Sunday or every Tuesday throughout his life and a festival or the day preceding Yom Kippur18When it is a mitzvah to eat in preparation for the fast (Rosh HaShanah 9a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 604:1). falls on that day, he is obligated to fast. Needless to say, this applies with regard to Rosh Chodesh. If, however, Chanukah or Purim fall [on these days], his vow is superceded by [the celebrations of] these days. Since the prohibition against fasting on them is based on Rabbinic decree, reinforcement is necessary.19In contrast to the Sabbath and festivals where the obligation to eat is of Scriptural origin. This is a general principle in Talmudic Law. There are times when our Sages gave their decrees greater power than Scriptural Law, for Scriptural Law is revered by the people at large and does not require reinforcement. If, by contrast, Rabbinic Law was abrogated in such instances, it might lead people to take leniencies even when uncalled for (see Ta'anis 17b; Kessef Mishneh). The Radbaz explains that if keeping one's vow was allowed to override a Rabbinic decree, then there would be no point in making such decrees. For people could nullify them by taking vows. For example, a person could take a vow to drink ordinary gentile wine.The Kessef Mishneh also explains that although the obligation to eat on Rosh Chodesh and the day preceding Yom Kippur is also of Rabbinic origin, since our Sages found an allusion to it in the Torah, it is less likely that people will treat it lightly. Hence, his vow is superceded by the Rabbinic decree.
י׳כֵּיצַד אֵין הַנְּדָרִים חָלִים אֶלָּא עַל דָּבָר שֶׁיֵּשׁ בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ. הָאוֹמֵר דִּבּוּרִי עָלֶיךָ קָרְבָּן אֵינוֹ אָסוּר מִלְּדַבֵּר עִמּוֹ שֶׁהַדִּבּוּר אֵין בּוֹ מַמָּשׁ. וְכֵן אִם אָמַר לוֹ דִּבּוּרִי אָסוּר עָלֶיךָ אֵין זֶה כְּאוֹמֵר פֵּרוֹתַי אֲסוּרִין עָלֶיךָ אוֹ פֵּרוֹתַי קָרְבָּן עָלֶיךָ שֶׁהֵן אֲסוּרִין עָלָיו. לְפִיכָךְ הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ קָרְבָּן שֶׁאֵינִי מְדַבֵּר עִמְּךָ אוֹ שֶׁאֵינִי עוֹשֶׂה עִמְּךָ אוֹ שֶׁאֵינִי מְהַלֵּךְ עִמְּךָ. אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר קָרְבָּן שֶׁאֵינִי יָשֵׁן שֶׁאֵינִי מְדַבֵּר שֶׁאֵינִי מְהַלֵּךְ. אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר לְאִשְׁתּוֹ קָרְבָּן שֶׁאֵינִי מְשַׁמְּשֵׁךְ אֵין הַנֵּדֶר חָל בְּכָל אֵלּוּ. וַהֲרֵי זֶה כְּאוֹמֵר דִּבּוּרִי וְהִלּוּכִי וַעֲשִׂיָּתִי וְשִׁמּוּשִׁי קָרְבָּן שֶׁהֵן דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן מַמָּשׁ:
10What is meant by the statement that vows take effect only with regards to entities of substance? If one says: "My speech is like a sacrifice for you,"20I.e., he takes a vow against the other person listening to his speech. he is not forbidden to speak to him, because speech is not an entity of substance. Similarly, if he tells him: "My speech is forbidden to you," it is not like his saying: "my produce is forbidden to you," or "My produce is like a sacrifice for you," in which instance, [the produce] would be forbidden.Therefore, if a person tells a colleague: "[It is like a vow for] a sacrifice that I will not speak with you," "...that I will not act on your behalf," or "...that I will not go with you," or he told his wife, "[It is like a vow for] a sacrifice that I will not be intimate with you," his vow does not take effect in all these instances. For this is as if he is saying: "My speech, going, actions, or intimacy is like a sacrifice, and none [of these are] entities of substance.21If, however, he states: "The satisfaction that I receive from any of the above is forbidden," his vow is effective, for the satisfaction is considered substantial. See Chapter 12, Halachah 9.
י״אאֲבָל הָאוֹמֵר יֵאָסֵר פִּי לְדִבּוּרוֹ וְיָדַי לְמַעֲשֵׂיהֶן וְרַגְלַי לְהִלּוּכָן וְעֵינַי לִשְׁנָתָן הֲרֵי הַנֵּדֶר חָל עֲלֵיהֶן. לְפִיכָךְ הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵרוֹ קָרְבָּן פִּי מִלְּדַבֵּר עִמְּךָ וְיָדַי מִלַּעֲשׂוֹת עִמְּךָ וְרַגְלַי מִלְּהַלֵּךְ עִמְּךָ הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר. וְכֵן הָאוֹמֵר הֲרֵי עָלַי קָרְבָּן אִם אֲדַבֵּר עִם פְּלוֹנִי אוֹ אִם לֹא אֲדַבֵּר עִמּוֹ וְעָבַר עַל דְּבָרוֹ חַיָּב בְּקָרְבָּן. וְכֵן אִם נָדַר דִּבַּרְתִּי וְלֹא דִּבַּרְתִּי וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהֶן שֶׁאֵין אֵלּוּ נִדְרֵי אִסָּר שֶׁאָנוּ מְבָאֲרִין מִשְׁפְּטֵיהֶם אֶלָּא נִדְרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ:
11When, by contrast, a person says: "Let my mouth be forbidden to speak, my hands to act, my feet to walk, and my eyes to sleep," his vow is effective with regard to them.22For these organs are objects of substance (Nedarim 13b). Therefore if a person tells a colleague: "My mouth is like a sacrifice with regard to speaking with you, my hands [are so] with regard to acting on your behalf, and my feet [are so] with regard to going with you," he becomes forbidden.Similarly, one who tells a colleague: "I will be obligated to bring a sacrifice if I speak to so-and-so" or "...if I don't speak to so-and-so," he is obligated to bring a sacrifice if he violates this commitment. Similarly, if he took a vow in which he said: "[If] I spoke [to so-and-so, I must bring a sacrifice]" or "[If] I did not speak..." or the like, [he is liable]. For these are not vows in which he accepts prohibitions upon himself23And apply only to entities of substance. whose ground rules we are explaining here, but vows of dedication.24Which are described in Hilchot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot, chs. 6 and 9. See also Chapter 1 where the Rambam makes a distinction between these two types of vows.
י״בהַנּוֹדֵר בִּדְבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶם מַמָּשׁ וַאֲסָרָן אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין הַנֵּדֶר חָל עֲלֵיהֶם אֵין מוֹרִים לוֹ שֶׁיִּנְהֹג בָּהֶן הֶתֵּר הוֹאִיל וְאָסַר עַצְמוֹ בָּהֶן וּבְדַעְתּוֹ שֶׁהַנֵּדֶר חָל עֲלֵיהֶן. אֶלָּא פּוֹתְחִין לוֹ פֶּתַח מִמָּקוֹם אַחֵר וּמַתִּירִין לוֹ נִדְרוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא נֶאֱסַר כְּדֵי שֶׁלֹּא יִנְהֲגוּ קַלּוּת רֹאשׁ בִּנְדָרִים:
12Although when a person takes a vow concerning entities that are not of substance and forbids them, the vow does not take effect with regard to them, we do not rule that he should act as if they are permitted. [Instead,] since he willingly [took a vow] forbidding them to him, [according to Rabbinic decree]25See Nedarim 15a. Similarly, in his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 2:1), the Rambam writes that the prohibition against desecrating one's word applies with regard to these vows. Compare to Chapter 4, Halachah 4. the vow took effect with regard to them. Although they are not forbidden, we give him an opportunity [to ask for the vow's release] from another vantage point and then release the vow, so that he will not act frivolously with regard to vows.26See Chapter 2, Halachot 12-13.