Rambam — 3 Perakimרמב״ם ג׳ פרקים

א׳הַנּוֹדֵר אוֹ הַנִּשְׁבָּע שֶׁאֵינִי טוֹעֵם הַיּוֹם אֵינוֹ אָסוּר אֶלָּא עַד שֶׁתֶּחֱשַׁךְ. שֶׁאֵינִי טוֹעֵם יוֹם אֶחָד אָסוּר מֵעֵת לְעֵת מִשְּׁעַת נִדְרוֹ. לְפִיכָךְ הַנּוֹדֵר שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם הַיּוֹם אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהוּא מֻתָּר מִשֶּׁתֶּחְשַׁךְ לֹא יֹאכַל מִשֶּׁתֶּחְשַׁךְ עַד שֶׁיִּשְׁאַל לְחָכָם. גְּזֵרָה שֶׁמָּא יִשָּׁבַע פַּעַם אַחֶרֶת יוֹם אֶחָד וְיֹאכַל מִשֶּׁתֶּחְשַׁךְ שֶׁהֲרֵי אֵין כָּל הָעָם יוֹדְעִים הֶפְרֵשׁ שֶׁבֵּין זֶה לָזֶה:

¹When a person takes a vow or an oath, saying: "I will not taste [food] today," he is forbidden only until nightfall.1For that is the end of the day in halachic terms. [If he said]: "I will not taste food for one day," he is forbidden [to eat] for a twenty-four hour period after taking his vow. Accordingly, even though he is permitted [to eat] after nightfall, one who takes a vow "not to taste [food] today" should not eat after nightfall until he asks a sage [to retract his vow]. [This is] a decree lest he take an oath another time not to eat for an entire day and eat after nightfall. For people at large do not know the difference between these two situations.

ב׳נָדַר שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם יוֹם הֲרֵי זֶה סָפֵק וְאָסוּר מֵעֵת לְעֵת כְּאוֹמֵר יוֹם אֶחָד. וְאִם אָכַל אַחַר שֶׁחֲשֵׁכָה אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה. שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם שַׁבָּת זוֹ הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר בִּשְׁאָר יְמֵי הַשַּׁבָּת וּבְיוֹם הַשַּׁבָּת. וַהֲרֵי הוּא מֻתָּר מֵאֶחָד בְּשַׁבָּת. שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם שַׁבָּת אַחַת הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר שִׁבְעָה יָמִים מֵעֵת לְעֵת. אָמַר שַׁבָּת סְתָם וְלֹא פֵּרֵשׁ לֹא אַחַת וְלֹא זוֹ הֲרֵי סָפֵק וְאָסוּר שִׁבְעָה יָמִים מֵעֵת לְעֵת. וְאִם אָכַל אַחַר שַׁבָּת אֵינוֹ לוֹקֶה כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:

²When one takes a vow, saying: "I will not taste [food] a day," there is an unresolved question.2Nedarim 60a discusses this issue without reaching a conclusion. [Hence] he is forbidden to [eat] for an entire day, as if he had said "for one day." If he eats after nightfall, he does not receive lashes.3I.e., for lashes are not given when there is a doubt.When one takes a vow, saying: "I will not taste [food] during this week,"4The Rambam uses the Hebrew term Shabbat, which literally means "Sabbath." Nevertheless, his intent (and that of his source, Nedarim 60a) is obviously a week and not the holy day itself.When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:3) uses the term shavua for "week," rather than Shabbat. The Turei Zahav 220:2 states that the Shulchan Aruch's ruling applies when the person taking the vow speaks in lashon hakodesh, "the holy tongue." If, however, he would speak in Yiddish and say di voch, "this week," the Sabbath is not included, because the term voch implies ordinary, weekdays that are different in nature than the holy Sabbath. he is forbidden to eat during the remainder of the week and on the Sabbath, but he is permitted on Sunday.5Even if a week has not passed since the vow was taken. The Radbaz states that the vow takes effect only when it is made during the week. If, however, it is made on the Sabbath, it takes effect only on the Sabbath itself, for the week has already concluded. [When he says:] "I will not taste [a type of food]6We are forced to say that he is referring only to one type of food. For if a person takes a vow that he will not eat at all for an entire week, the vow does not take effect, for it is impossible that he will fulfill it. See Hilchot Sh'vuot 1:7. for one week," he is forbidden to eat [that type of food] for seven full days. If he says "[I will not eat a type of food] a week," there is an unresolved question. [Hence] he is forbidden to [eat that type of food] for seven full days. If he eats after the Sabbath, he does not receive lashes, as we explained.7In the first clause of this halachah.

ג׳שֶׁאֲנִי שׁוֹתֶה חֹדֶשׁ זֶה אָסוּר בִּשְׁאָר יְמֵי הַחֹדֶשׁ. אֲבָל בְּיוֹם רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ יִהְיֶה מֻתָּר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהָיָה חֹדֶשׁ חָסֵר. שֶׁאֲנִי טוֹעֵם חֹדֶשׁ אֶחָד אָסוּר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם גְּמוּרִים מֵעֵת לְעֵת. נָדַר חֹדֶשׁ סְתָם אָסוּר שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם מֵעֵת לְעֵת מִסָּפֵק:

³[When one takes a vow, saying:] "I will not drink [wine] during this month," he is forbidden in the remaining days of the month. He is, however, permitted on the day of the following Rosh Chodesh even if the month is lacking.8A month which is lacking is a month of 29 days [as opposed to a month of 30 days; see Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, chs. 1-3, which discusses the principles determining when a month is given only 29 days and when it is given 30].The commentaries question why the Rambam (based on Nedarim 60b) speaks of the month being lacking. Seemingly, it is quite obvious that if there are only 29 days in a month, one would be permitted on Rosh Chodesh in the next month. The new month has already begun. A point that has to be made is that even if there are 30 days in a month, one is permitted to partake of wine on the thirtieth day. Since it is Rosh Chodesh of the coming month, the vow has concluded even though the date is the thirtieth of the previous month.The Radbaz explains that this in fact is the Rambam's intent, even though his wording is somewhat difficult to explain in that manner. This interpretation is reflected in the wording of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:4). The Or Sameach offers a different interpretation, stating that when a month has only 29 days, sometimes the conjunction of the sun and the moon does not take place until the first day of the new month. Even so, since it is already Rosh Chodesh, the vow is concluded. [If he took a vow, saying]: "I will not drink [wine] for an entire month," he is forbidden for 30 full days. [If he said]: I will not drink [wine] for a month," he is forbidden for 30 full days because of the unresolved question.9As explained in the previous halachah.

ד׳שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל בָּשָׂר שָׁנָה זוֹ אֲפִלּוּ לֹא נִשְׁאַר מִן הַשָּׁנָה אֶלָּא יוֹם אֶחָד אֵין אָסוּר אֶלָּא אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם. וּבְיוֹם רֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה מֻתָּר. וְרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה לִנְדָרִים הוּא יוֹם רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ תִּשְׁרֵי. שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל שָׁנָה אַחַת הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר שָׁנָה תְּמִימָה מִיּוֹם לְיוֹם. וְאִם נִתְעַבְּרָה הַשָּׁנָה אָסוּר בָּהּ וּבְעִבּוּרָהּ. שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹכֵל שָׁנָה הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר שָׁנָה תְּמִימָה מִיּוֹם לְיוֹם מִסָּפֵק כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:

⁴[When one takes a vow, saying:] "I will not eat meat this year," even if there is only one day left in the year,10I.e., he made the vow on the twenty-ninth of Elul. he is forbidden only that day and is permitted to eat [meat] on Rosh HaShanah. For the beginning of the year with regard to vows is Rosh Chodesh Tishrei.11Although Rosh Chodesh Nisan is considered the beginning of the year in certain contexts, this does not apply with regard to vows.[If he says:] "I will not eat [meat] for one year," he is forbidden for a complete year12I.e., a full year on the Jewish calendar. from day to day. If it is a leap year,13And a month is added. See Hilchot Kiddush HaChodesh, ch. 4. he is forbidden in that year and in the extra month. [If he says]: "I will not eat [meat] for a year," he is forbidden for a complete year from day to day, because of the unresolved question as explained.14In Halachah 2.

ה׳שֶׁאֲנִי שׁוֹתֶה יַיִן שָׁבוּעַ זֶה אָסוּר בִּשְׁאָר שְׁנֵי הַשָּׁבוּעַ וּבִשְׁנַת הַשְּׁמִטָּה. וְאֵינוֹ מֻתָּר אֶלָּא מֵרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה שֶׁל מוֹצָאֵי שְׁבִיעִית. שֶׁאֲנִי שׁוֹתֶה יַיִן שָׁבוּעַ אֶחָד אָסוּר שֶׁבַע שָׁנִים גְּמוּרוֹת מִיּוֹם לְיוֹם. אָמַר יוֹבֵל זֶה אָסוּר בִּשְׁאָר שְׁנֵי הַיּוֹבֵל וּבִשְׁנַת חֲמִשִּׁים עַצְמָהּ:

⁵[When one takes a vow, saying:] "I will not drink wine this seven-year cycle," he is forbidden in the remaining years of the seven year cycle and in the Sabbatical year.15Like the Sabbath is the conclusion of the week, the Sabbatical year is the conclusion of the seven year cycle (Radbaz). He is not permitted until Rosh HaShanah of the year after the Sabbatical year.[If he says:] "I will not drink wine for a seven-year cycle," he is forbidden for seven full years from day to day. [If he says: "I will not drink wine] this Jubilee cycle, he is forbidden in the remaining years of the Jubilee cycle and in the fiftieth year itself.16For the Jubilee year is considered as the conclusion of the 50 year cycle.

ו׳שֶׁאֲנִי שׁוֹתֶה יַיִן עַד רֹאשׁ אֲדָר אִם הָיְתָה שָׁנָה מְעֻבֶּרֶת וְלֹא יָדַע שֶׁהִיא מְעֻבֶּרֶת כְּשֶׁנָּדַר אֵינוֹ אָסוּר אֶלָּא עַד רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ אֲדָר רִאשׁוֹן. וְאִם נָדַר עַד סוֹף אֲדָר הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר עַד סוֹף אֲדָר שֵׁנִי. וְאִם יָדַע שֶׁהַשָּׁנָה מְעֻבֶּרֶת וְנָדַר עַד רֹאשׁ אֲדָר אָסוּר עַד רֹאשׁ אֲדָר שֵׁנִי:

⁶[The following rules apply when one says:] "I will not drink wine until Rosh Chodesh Adar: If it was a leap year, but he did not know that it was a leap year when he took the vow, he is forbidden only until Rosh Chodesh Adar I.17For his intent was Adar that follows Shvat. If he took the vow until the end of Adar, he is forbidden until the end of Adar II.18For his intent was to remain forbidden for the entire time referred to as Adar. This applies whether he knew that it was a leap year or not (Radbaz). If he did know that it was a leap year, he is forbidden until Rosh Chodesh Adar II.19There is a difference of opinion among the Sages (Nedarim 63a) which of the two months Adar is considered as Adar and which is the additional month. There are other authorities who follow a different version of the passage in Nedarim and maintain that he is always forbidden only until the beginning of Adar I.The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:8) mentions the Rambam's view as a minority opinion. The commentaries note that in other places in the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 43:28, Rama, Even HaEzer 126:7), the Rambam's view is not cited at all.

ז׳הָאוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ בְּדָבָר עַד הַפֶּסַח בֵּין שֶׁאָמַר עַד פְּנֵי הַפֶּסַח בֵּין שֶׁאָמַר עַד הַפֶּסַח אֵינוֹ אָסוּר אֶלָּא עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ בִּלְבַד. וְאִם אָמַר עַד שֶׁיִּהְיֶה הַפֶּסַח הֲרֵי אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיֵּצֵא הַפֶּסַח. אָמַר עַד הַקָּצִיר אוֹ עַד הַבָּצִיר אוֹ שֶׁאָמַר עַד שֶׁיִּהְיֶה הַבָּצִיר אוֹ הַקָּצִיר אֵינוֹ אָסוּר אֶלָּא עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ:

⁷When a person forbids himself from benefiting from a substance until Pesach, whether he said "until before Pesach" or "until Pesach," he is only forbidden until the holiday commences. If he says: "while it is Pesach,"20We have translated the expression to fit the meaning given it by the Rambam. he is forbidden until Pesach concludes. If he said: "until the wheat harvest" or "until the grape harvest," or "while it is the grape harvest" or "while it is the wheat harvest," he is forbidden only until that time arrives.21The rationale for this ruling is explained in the following halachah.

ח׳זֶה הַכְּלָל כָּל שֶׁזְּמַנּוֹ קָבוּעַ וְנָדַר עָדָיו אֵין אָסוּר אֶלָּא עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ. וְאִם נָדַר עַד שֶׁיִּהְיֶה הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיֵּצֵא. וְכָל שֶׁאֵין לוֹ זְמַן קָבוּעַ כְּגוֹן זְמַן הַקָּצִיר וְהַבָּצִיר בֵּין שֶׁנָּדַר עָדָיו בֵּין שֶׁנָּדַר עַד שֶׁיִּהְיֶה אֵינוֹ אָסוּר אֶלָּא עַד שֶׁיַּגִּיעַ:

⁸This is the general principle: Whenever there is a fixed time22Like Pesach which lasts for seven days (eight in the Diaspora) as prescribed by the Torah. for a subject mentioned in a vow, he is forbidden only until that time comes. If he words [his vow] "as long as it is," he is forbidden until that time concludes. Whenever a subject does not have a fixed time - like the time of the wheat harvest or the grape harvest23There is no fixed time for the harvest's conclusion, for that depends on how plentiful it will be. - whether he said "until" or "while it is," he is forbidden only until that time arrives.24For we do not assume that he took a vow of undetermined length.

ט׳הָאוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ בְּדָבָר עַד הַקַּיִץ הֲרֵי אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיַּתְחִילוּ אַנְשֵׁי הַמָּקוֹם שֶׁנָּדַר בּוֹ לְהַכְנִיס כַּלְכָּלוֹת תְּאֵנִים. עַד הַקָּצִיר עַד שֶׁיַּתְחִילוּ הָעָם לִקְצֹר קְצִיר חִטִּים אֲבָל לֹא קְצִיר שְׂעוֹרִים. פֵּרֵשׁ וְאָמַר עַד שֶׁיַּעֲבֹר הַקַּיִץ הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיִּכְפְּלוּ הָעָם רֹב הַמַּחְצְלָאוֹת שֶׁבַּמֻּקְצֶה שֶׁמְּיַבְּשִׁין עֲלֵיהֶם תְּאֵנִים וַעֲנָבִים לַעֲשׂוֹתָם גְּרוֹגָרוֹת וְצִמּוּקִים הַכּל לְפִי מְקוֹם נִדְרוֹ שֶׁל נוֹדֵר:

⁹When a person forbids himself [from benefiting from] a substance until the kayitz,25In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 8:3), the Rambam defines this as referring to the period from the end of Tammuz until the end of Elul when figs ripen and are ready for harvesting. he is forbidden until the people in his place begin bringing in baskets of figs. [If he vowed] until the katzir, [he is forbidden] until people will harvest wheat, but not barley.26The wheat harvest is several weeks after the barley harvest. Since wheat is the more important crop, it is given prominence (Kessef Mishneh).If he explicitly said: "...until the kayitz passes," he is forbidden until the majority of the people fold up the mats they have set aside to dry figs and grapes to produce dried figs and raisins.27The figs and grapes would be laid out upon the mats to dry in the sun. Everything depends on the local practice in the place where the person took his vow.28As the Rambam explains in the following halachah.

י׳כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁנָּדַר בְּבִקְעָה וְאָסַר עַצְמוֹ בַּדָּבָר עַד הַקַּיִץ וְעָלָה לָהָר אֵינוֹ מִסְתַּכֵּל בַּקַּיִץ שֶׁל מָקוֹם שֶׁהוּא בּוֹ עַתָּה אִם הִגִּיעַ אִם לֹא הִגִּיעַ. אֶלָּא בַּקַּיִץ שֶׁל מָקוֹם שֶׁנָּדַר בּוֹ וְעָלָיו הוּא סוֹמֵךְ. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

¹⁰What is implied? If he took a vow in a valley and forbid himself [from benefiting] from a substance until the kayitz and then moved to a mountainous region,29A mountainous region is cooler in the summer than a valley and the figs there will ripen later. he should not pay attention to the time whether or not the fig harvest has begun in the place where he is at present. Instead, [he is concerned] with when it begins in the place where he took the vow and that is what he follows.30For that was his intent when he took the vow. It does not matter if this leads to a more lenient ruling or a more stringent one [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:13). Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.31E.g., if he took a vow until the katzir in a place where the primary crop is barley, he is forbidden until the beginning of the barley harvest (ibid.:14).

י״אהָאוֹסֵר עַצְמוֹ בְּדָבָר עַד הַגֶּשֶׁם. הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר עַד זְמַן הַגְּשָׁמִים שֶׁהוּא בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל רֹאשׁ חֹדֶשׁ כִּסְלֵו. הִגִּיעַ זְמַן הַגְּשָׁמִים הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר בֵּין יָרְדוּ גְּשָׁמִים בֵּין לֹא יָרְדוּ. וְאִם יָרְדוּ גְּשָׁמִים מִשִּׁבְעָה עָשָׂר בְּמַרְחֶשְׁוָן הֲרֵי זֶה מֻתָּר. וְאִם אָמַר עַד הַגְּשָׁמִים הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיֵּרְדוּ הַגְּשָׁמִים. וְהוּא שֶׁיָּרְדוּ מִזְּמַן רְבִיעָה שְׁנִיָּה שֶׁהוּא בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמְקוֹמוֹת הַסְּמוּכִין לָהּ מִכ"ג בְּמַרְחֶשְׁוָן וְאֵילָךְ. וְאִם פֵּרֵשׁ וְאָמַר עַד שֶׁיִּפָּסְקוּ הַגְּשָׁמִים הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר עַד שֶׁיַּעֲבֹר הַפֶּסַח בְּאֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל וּבִמְקוֹמוֹת שֶׁהֵם כְּמוֹתָהּ:

¹¹When a person forbids himself [from benefiting] from a substance until "the rains," he is forbidden until the rainy season which in Eretz Yisrael [begins] on Rosh Chodesh Kislev. When the time of the rainy season arrives, he is released [from his vow] whether it rains or not. If, however, it rained from the seventeenth of MarCheshvan, he is released.32The seventeenth of MarCheshvan begins the first phase of the rainy season. Although it is really an extension of the summer and not the beginning of the winter (the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah, Pe'ah 7:5), rain at that time is not considered a chance occurrence and the vow is released. See Hilchot Ta'aniot 3:1-2 and Hilchot Matanot Aniyim 1:11 which also discuss these times for rain.If he said: "...Until it rains," he is forbidden until it rains, provided it rains from the second phase of the preliminary rainy season.33In his Commentary to the Mishnah (ibid.), the Rambam interprets the term reviah as referring to the time when rain descends, explaining that it is similar to the term used for impregnating a woman, because in both cases, the potential for life is granted. In Eretz Yisrael and in the places close to it, this is from the twenty-third of MarCheshvan onward. If he explicitly said: "...until the rains cease," he is forbidden until the conclusion of Pesach in Eretz Yisrael and in the places like it.34For that is when the rains cease there. In the Diaspora, different laws apply with regard to all these expressions according to the local conditions.

י״במִי שֶׁהִדִּיר אֶת אִשְׁתּוֹ בְּמַרְחֶשְׁוָן וְאָמַר לָהּ שֶׁאֵין אַתְּ נֶהֱנֵית לִי מִכָּאן וְעַד הַפֶּסַח אִם תֵּלְכִי לְבֵית אָבִיךָ מֵהַיּוֹם וְעַד סֻכּוֹת הֲרֵי זוֹ אֲסוּרָה לֵהָנוֹת לוֹ מִיָּד גְּזֵרָה שֶׁמָּא תֵּלֵךְ. וְאִם הָלְכָה לִפְנֵי הַפֶּסַח וַהֲרֵי הוּא מְהַנֶּה אוֹתָהּ לִפְנֵי הַפֶּסַח הֲרֵי זֶה לוֹקֶה. עָבַר הַפֶּסַח אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהָלַךְ הַתְּנַאי הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר לִנְהֹג חֻלִּין בְּנִדְרוֹ וּלְהַנִּיחָהּ שֶׁתֵּלֵךְ וְתֶהֱנֶה. אֶלָּא נוֹהֵג בָּהּ אִסּוּר עַד הֶחָג כְּמוֹ שֶׁנָּדַר. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁתָּלָה הַנֵּדֶר בְּאִסּוּר זְמַן שֶׁעָבַר. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. וְאִם הָלְכָה אַחַר הַפֶּסַח אֵינָהּ אֲסוּרָה מִלֵּהָנוֹת לוֹ:

¹²When a person has his wife bound by a vow in MarCheshvan, telling her: "You may not benefit from me from now until Pesach if you go to your father's house from now until Sukkot," she is forbidden to benefit from him immediately. [This is] a decree for perhaps she will go.35And thus retroactively, she will be forbidden to derive benefit from the time the vow was taken. Had she been allowed to derive benefit, after she broke the vow, it would be a transgression. If she went before Pesach and derived benefit from him before Pesach, he is liable for lashes.36For he allowed her to benefit from his property, thus committing a transgression. The woman is not liable for lashes (Radbaz). Others (Rashba, Rosh, Nedarim 57b) differ with the Rambam and maintain that the woman is liable for lashes.If Pesach passed, even though the stipulation has expired,37For she did not benefit from him until Pesach. it is forbidden for him to treat the vow casually and allow her to go [to her father's home] and derive benefit from him.38The Merkevat HaMishneh explains that he should continue to withhold benefit from her, for that is the only way that he can insure that she will keep the vow. The Ra'avad and others differ with the Rambam concerning the need for this safeguard and their view is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 220:22). Instead, he should treat her as if it is forbidden until Sukkot as he vowed. [This applies] even though he made the vow dependent on a time that has already passed. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. If she went [to her father's home] after Pesach, she is not forbidden to benefit from him.39For the time for the stipulation has passed.

י״גאָמַר לָהּ שֶׁאֵין אַתְּ נֶהֱנֵית לִי עַד הֶחָג אִם תֵּלְכִי לְבֵית אָבִיךָ עַד הַפֶּסַח אֲסוּרָה לֵהָנוֹת מִיָּד. וְאִם הָלְכָה לִפְנֵי הַפֶּסַח וְנִמְצָא מְהַנֶּה אוֹתָהּ הֲרֵי זֶה לוֹקֶה וַאֲסוּרָה בַּהֲנָיָתוֹ עַד הֶחָג וּמֻתֶּרֶת לֵילֵךְ לְבֵית אָבִיהָ מִשֶּׁהִגִּיעַ הַפֶּסַח:

¹³If he told her: "You may not benefit from me from now until Sukkot if you go to your father's house from now until Pesach," she is forbidden to benefit from him immediately.40As above. If she went [to her father's home] before Pesach and he gave her benefit, he is subject to lashes. She remains forbidden to him until Sukkot.41I.e., even if he was subjected to lashes for one transgression. After Pesach arrives, she is permitted to go to her father's house.42Because the term of the vow was completed. This applies even if she broke the vow and went before Pesach (Radbaz).

א׳קָטָן בֶּן שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד וּקְטַנָּה בַּת אַחַת עֶשְׂרֵה שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד שֶׁנִּשְׁבְּעוּ אוֹ נָדְרוּ בֵּין נִדְרֵי אִסָּר בֵּין נִדְרֵי הֶקְדֵּשׁ בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתָן וְשׁוֹאֲלִין אוֹתָן. אִם יוֹדְעִין לְשֵׁם מִי נָדְרוּ וּלְשֵׁם מִי הִקְדִּישׁוּ וְנִשְׁבְּעוּ נִדְרֵיהֶן קַיָּמִים וְהֶקְדֵּשָׁן הֶקְדֵּשׁ. וְאִם לֹא יָדְעוּ אֵין בְּנִדְרֵיהֶם וּבְדִבְרֵיהֶם כְּלוּם. וּצְרִיכִין בְּדִיקָה כָּל הַשָּׁנָה כֻּלָּהּ שֶׁהִיא שְׁנַת י"ב לִקְטַנָּה. וּשְׁנַת י"ג לְקָטָן:

¹[The following rules apply with regard to] a male minor who is twelve years and one day old1As explained by the commentaries, in this context, we follow the principle: "A portion of a day is considered as an entire day." Thus, directly after his twelfth birthday, as soon as a male child enters into his thirteenth year of life, these laws apply to him. Similar concepts apply with regard to a female minor. and a female minor who is eleven years and one day old who took an oath or a vow, whether a vow forbidding something to them or a vow consecrating an article. We investigate them and ask them [questions]. If they know for Whose sake they took the vow2For a vow must be taken for God's sake, as Numbers 30:3 states: "When a man will take a vow to God." or for Whose sake they consecrated [the article] or took the oath, their vows and their consecration are binding.3This is a unique concept that Niddah 45b derives from the exegesis of Leviticus 27:2. Although throughout Jewish law, until a male attains the age of thirteen and a female, the age of twelve, their actions are of no consequence according to Scriptural Law, an exception is made in this instance because of the above verse, as stated in Halachah 4. If they do not know, their vows and their statements are of no consequence.It is necessary to make an investigation throughout the entire twelfth year of a female minor and the entire thirteenth year of a male minor.4As explained in the following halachah.

ב׳כֵּיצַד. הֲרֵי שֶׁנָּדְרוּ אוֹ הִקְדִּישׁוּ בִּתְחִלַּת שָׁנָה זוֹ וְשָׁאֲלוּ אוֹתָן וְנִמְצְאוּ יוֹדְעִין וְנִתְקַיֵּם נִדְרָן וְנָדְרוּ נֵדֶר אַחֵר אֲפִלּוּ בְּסוֹף שָׁנָה זוֹ צְרִיכִין בְּדִיקָה וְאַחַר כָּךְ יִתְקַיֵּם. וְאֵין אוֹמְרִין הוֹאִיל וְנִמְצְאוּ יוֹדְעִין בִּתְחִלַּת הַשָּׁנָה אֵין צְרִיכִין בְּדִיקָה אֶלָּא בּוֹדְקִין אוֹתָן אֶת כָּל הַשָּׁנָה הַזּוֹ כֻּלָּהּ:

²What is implied? A minor took a vow or consecrated [property] at the beginning of the year, they were questioned, it was discovered that they knew [for Whose sake the vow was taken], and the vow was maintained. If they took another vow, even at the end of this year, they must be questioned again [for the vow] to be maintained. We do not say: "Since they were knowledgeable at the beginning of the year, they no longer have to be questioned. Instead, we question them throughout the entire year.5The Kessef Mishneh questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that Niddah, loc. cit., the source for this halachah, does not lead to such a conclusion. He suggests that perhaps the Rambam had a different version of that text. Yayin Malchut states that this resolution is reflected in the revised version of the Rambam's Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 5:6). In his initial explanation of the mishnah, he appeared to follow the same text as the popular version of the Talmud, but later in life, he revised that interpretation, accepting a different version of the text. The Rambam's rationale is that since we are speaking about a minor, it is possible that his level of understanding will fluctuate.

ג׳קֹדֶם הַזְּמַן הַזֶּה אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרוּ יוֹדְעִין אָנוּ לְשֵׁם מִי נָדַרְנוּ וּלְשֵׁם מִי הִקְדַּשְׁנוּ אֵין נִדְרֵיהֶן נֵדֶר וְאֵין הֶקְדֵּשָׁן הֶקְדֵּשׁ. וְאַחַר הַזְּמַן הַזֶּה שֶׁנִּמְצָא הַבֵּן בֶּן י"ג שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד וְהַבַּת בַּת י"ב שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרוּ אֵין אָנוּ יוֹדְעִין לְשֵׁם מִי נָדַרְנוּ וּלְשֵׁם מִי הִקְדַּשְׁנוּ דִּבְרֵיהֶן קַיָּמִין וְהֶקְדֵּשָׁן הֶקְדֵּשׁ וְנִדְרֵיהֶן נְדָרִים וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הֵבִיאוּ שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת. וְזוֹ הִיא עוֹנַת נְדָרִים הָאֲמוּרָה בְּכָל מָקוֹם:

³Before this time, even when they say: "We know for Whose sake we took the vow or for Whose sake we consecrated it," their vows and their consecration are of no consequence. After this time [passes] and a male is thirteen years and one day and a female is twelve years and one day,6I.e., their thirteenth and twelfth birthdays arrive as stated in note 1.In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Niddah 5:6), the Rambam writes that the Torah made the age for which women become responsible for their vows less than the age men become responsible, generally, a woman's lifetime is less than that of a man. even though they say: "We do not know for Whose sake we took the vow or for Whose sake we consecrated it,"7If they manifested signs that they are mentally or emotionally incapable, this law does not apply. If, however, they are merely somewhat slow and do not understand the concept of vows, their vows are of consequence, because they have already reached the age when one becomes responsible for his or her actions. their vows and their consecration are binding even if they did not manifest physical signs of maturity.8I.e., two pubic hairs as stated in Hilchot Ishut 2:1. This is the time when vows [take effect] which is mentioned in all sources.9There are others who maintain that the expression "the time when vows [take effect]" refers to a minor who understands the meaning of his vows as stated in Halachah 1. The Rambam prefers his interpretation, because it is dependent on time, the child's age, while the first interpretation is dependent on the child's knowledge (Yayim Malchut).

ד׳הוֹאִיל וְהִגִּיעוּ לִשְׁנֵי הַגְּדוֹלִים נִדְרֵיהֶן קַיָּמִין. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הֵבִיאוּ סִימָנִין וַעֲדַיִן לֹא נַעֲשׂוּ גְּדוֹלִים לְכָל דָּבָר. וְדָבָר זֶה מִדִּבְרֵי תּוֹרָה שֶׁהַמֻּפְלָא הַסָּמוּךְ לְאִישׁ הֶקְדֵּשׁוֹ וְנִדְרוֹ נֵדֶר. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּדְרֵיהֶן קַיָּמִין אִם חִלְּלוּ נִדְרָן אוֹ נִשְׁבְּעוּ וְהֶחְלִיפוּ אֵינָן לוֹקִין עַד שֶׁיַּגְדִּילוּ וְיָבִיאוּ שְׁתֵּי שְׂעָרוֹת:

⁴Since they reached the age of majority, their vows are binding even if they did not manifest physical signs of majority and [thus] are not considered as adults with regard to all matters. This concept is of Scriptural origin:10This is the subject of debate among the Rishonim, for some do not accept the Rambam's view. that when a person close to the age of adulthood utters a vow, his consecration [of articles] and his vows are binding. Nevertheless, although the vows of these individuals are binding, if they desecrate their vows or take oaths and substitute for them, they are not punishable by lashes until they reach the age of majority and manifest signs of physical maturity.11For until the latter age, they are still minors, and minors are not liable for punishment for transgressions that they perform.

ה׳הִקְדִּישׁוּ וּבָא הַגָּדוֹל וְנֶהֱנָה מִן הַהֶקְדֵּשׁ שֶׁהִקְדִּישׁוּ לוֹקֶה מִשּׁוּם שֶׁנִּדְרֵיהֶם נְדָרִים מִן הַתּוֹרָה כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:

⁵If [such a minor] consecrated an article and an adult came and benefited from the article that he consecrated, [the adult] is liable for lashes.12For violating the prohibition against benefiting from consecrated property (Hilchot Meilah 1:3). For [the minor's] vows are valid according to Scriptural Law, as explained.13In the previous halachah. Since the child's consecration is valid, the article has the status of a consecrated article according to Scriptural Law and a person who misappropriates it is liable.

ו׳בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים שֶׁבַּת י"ב שָׁנָה וְיוֹם אֶחָד נְדָרֶיהָ קַיָּמִין. בְּשֶׁלֹּא הָיְתָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָאָב אוֹ בִּרְשׁוּת הַבַּעַל. אֲבָל אִם הָיְתָה בִּרְשׁוּת הָאָב אֲפִלּוּ הִגְדִּילָה וַהֲרֵי הִיא נַעֲרָה. אָבִיהָ מֵפֵר כָּל נְדָרֶיהָ וְכָל שְׁבוּעוֹת שֶׁתִּשָּׁבַע בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר ל ו) "כָּל נְדָרֶיהָ וֶאֱסָרֶיהָ" וְגוֹ' (במדבר ל ו) "כִּי הֵנִיא אָבִיהָ אֹתָהּ" וְגוֹ':

⁶When does the above statement - that the vows taken by a female twelve years and one day old are binding - apply? When she is neither in her father's domain14I.e., her father died. Alternatively, she was married as a minor and then she was divorced or widowed (see Halachah 25). Otherwise, she remains in his domain until the age of twelve and a half, as stated in the following halachah. or her husband's domain. If, however, she is in her father's domain, even if she comes of age and she is a maiden,15I.e., from the age of twelve until the age of twelve and a half. her father may nullify16See Chapter 13, Halachah 2, which describes how the father nullifies his daughter's vow. all17As the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:1) states, this applies even to vows taken dependent on the consent of others which cannot be repealed by a sage. of the vows and oaths she takes on the day he hears of them, as [Numbers 30:6] states: "All of her vows and prohibitions18The HaEmek HaShaalah interprets this term as referring to oaths.... [shall not stand...] because her father withheld her."

ז׳וְעַד מָתַי אָבִיהָ מֵפֵר עַד שֶׁתִּבְגַּר. בָּגְרָה אֵינוֹ מֵפֵר לָהּ וַהֲרֵי כָּל נְדָרֶיהָ וּשְׁבוּעוֹתֶיהָ כְּנֵדֶר אַלְמָנָה וּגְרוּשָׁה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר בָּהֶן (במדבר ל י) "כּל אֲשֶׁר אָסְרָה עַל נַפְשָׁהּ" וְגוֹ':

⁷Until when may her father nullify [her vows]? Until she fully comes of age.19I.e., reaches the age of twelve and a half after manifesting physical signs of maturity (Hilchot Ishut 2:2). Once she fully comes of age, he may not nullify her [vows].20Numbers 30:17 gives him this privilege "during her maidenhood," i.e., and not beyond that time period (Kessef Mishneh). Instead, all of her vows and oaths are like those of a widow or a divorcee, as [implied by Numbers 30:10]: "Everything that she forbade upon her soul [shall remain upon her]."

ח׳וּמֵאֵימָתַי מֵפֵר הַבַּעַל נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ וּשְׁבוּעוֹתֶיהָ מִשֶּׁתִּכָּנֵס לַחֻפָּה. וְהוּא מֵפֵר לְעוֹלָם עַד שֶׁיְּגָרְשֶׁנָּה וְיַגִּיעַ הַגֵּט לְיָדָהּ. הָיְתָה מְגֹרֶשֶׁת מִסָּפֵק לֹא יָפֵר לָהּ. נָתַן לָהּ גֵּט עַל תְּנַאי אוֹ לְאַחַר זְמַן לֹא יָפֵר בַּיָּמִים שֶׁבֵּינְתַיִם. וְכֵן מִי שֶׁשָּׁמְעָה שֶׁמֵּת בַּעְלָהּ וְנִשֵּׂאת וַהֲרֵי בַּעְלָהּ קַיָּם וְכַיּוֹצֵא בָּהּ אֵין הַבַּעַל הָרִאשׁוֹן וְלֹא הָאַחֲרוֹן מְפֵרִין נְדָרֶיהָ. הָיְתָה מֵחַיָּבֵי לָאוִין וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לוֹמַר מֵחַיָּבֵי עֲשֵׂה וְהֵפֵר נְדָרֶיהָ הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מוּפָרִין:

⁸When may a husband nullify his wife's vows and oaths? From the time she enters the chupah.21I.e, from the beginning of the second sage of the marriage relationship known as nissuin. At that time, he takes her into a private room and from that time onward, the couple live as man and wife (Hilchot Ishut 10:1). During the first stage of the marriage relationship (erusin), when the erus has merely consecrated his wife, he does not have the right to nullify her vows alone (see Halachah 9). (In the present era, it is customary to perform both these stages of marriage directly after each other.) He may continue to nullify her vows forever until he divorces her, with the bill of divorce reaching her hand.22Implied is that if he sends the bill of divorce to her via an agent, he may nullify her vows until the bill of divorce enters her possession (Siftei Cohen 234:6, Turei Zahav 234:1).If there was an unresolved doubt concerning her divorce,23I.e., he had a bill of divorce given to her and our Rabbis could not resolve if the manner in which the bill of divorce was given or written is effective. See Hilchot Gerushin 5:13 for an example.The rationale for this law is that our Sages understood that the reason the Torah gave a husband the right to nullify his wife's vows was so that she would not become unattractive to him (Yevamot 90b). In this instance, he is not concerned that she becomes unattractive (Radbaz). he should not nullify her vows. If he gives her a bill of divorce conditionally24See Hilchot Gerushin 8:1. or one that takes effect at a later time,25He tells her: "Here is your bill of divorce, but it does not take effect for 30 days" (ibid. 9:1). he should not nullify [her vows] in the interim.26I.e., in the days before the vow takes effect. The Siftei Cohen 234:8 states that even after the fact, the nullification does not take effect. Similarly, [when a woman] has heard that her husband died and remarried, but [in truth] her husband was alive27See Hilchot Gerushin 10:5 which describes this situation at length. or other similar situations [prevail],28E.g., a woman who went through a divorce and then remarried, but then it was discovered that her divorce was invalid (ibid.:7). In both this and the previous instance, both husbands are required to divorce the woman. neither her first husband, nor her second husband should nullify her vows.29The rationale for this and the previous laws is that our Sages understood that the reason the Torah gave a husband the right to nullify his wife's vows was so that she would not become unattractive to him. In this instance, since he is obligated to divorce her, it is desirable that she become unattractive to him (Yevamot, loc. cit.). If she was forbidden [to her husband] by a negative commandment30I.e., a negative commandment that is not punishable by execution, death at the hand of heaven, or karet. See Hilchot Ishut 1:7. and needless to say, if she is forbidden only by a positive commandment,31E.g., marriages like that of a non-virgin to a High Priest, which are not prohibited by a negative commandment. Instead, the prohibition is understood, because there is a positive commandment instructing the opposite. See ibid.:8. and her husband nullified her vows, her vows are nullified.32Although these marriages are forbidden, since they are still binding, the husband has this privilege.

ט׳נַעֲרָה מְאֹרָסָה אֵין מֵפֵר נְדָרֶיהָ אֶלָּא הָאָב עִם הַבַּעַל כְּאַחַד. וְאִם הֵפֵר הָאֶחָד לְבַדּוֹ אֵינוֹ מוּפָר. הֵפֵר הַבַּעַל לְבַדּוֹ וְעָבְרָה עַל נִדְרָהּ קֹדֶם שֶׁיָּפֵר הָאָב אֵינָהּ לוֹקָה:

⁹When a maiden33I.e., a girl between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half. has been consecrated, her vows may be nullified only by her father and the erus34The term erus means "the man who consecrated her." The Rambam does not use this term, but instead, the term baal meaning "husband." We, however, have used the term erus, because the term baal usually implies that nisuin, the second stage of marriage, has already taken place. together.35Numbers 30:17 states: "These are the statutes... between a man and his wife, between a father and his daughter in her youth." Nedarim 68a interprets the verse as referring to one woman, implying that the nullification of her vows is performed by her father and her erus together. In his Commentary to the Mishnah (Nedarim 9:9), the Rambam writes that from the Biblical text, it might appear that both the father and the erus have the right to nullify her vows independently. Hence, it is necessary to clarify that this is not so. If one nullified [a vow] alone, it is not nullified. If her erus nullified [the vow] alone and she violated the vow before her father nullified it, she is not liable for lashes.36Nedarim 68a states that since one of the two has already nullified the vow, it is weak and its violation is not punishable by lashes.

י׳מֵת הָאָרוּס חָזְרָה לִרְשׁוּת אָבִיהָ. וְכָל שֶׁתִּדֹּר הָאָב מֵפֵר כְּשֶׁהָיָה קֹדֶם שֶׁתִּתְאָרֵס. מֵת הָאָב אַחַר שֶׁנִּתְאָרְסָה וְנָדְרָה אַחַר מוֹתוֹ אֵין הַבַּעַל מֵפֵר שֶׁאֵין הַבַּעַל מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ עַד שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לַחֻפָּה:

¹⁰If (the erus) dies, she returns to her father's domain. Any vow she takes37Even the vows she took previously while consecrated [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:11)]. This applies even if she has a yevam (Halachah 24). may be nullified by her father as was her status before consecration.38As stated in Halachah 6. If her father died after she was consecrated and she took a vow after his death, her erus cannot nullify it. For an erus cannot nullify his wife's vows [alone] until she enters the chupah.39Before nissuin, an erus can nullify his wife's vows only together with her father and that is impossible in this instance. See also Halachah 16.

י״אנַעֲרָה אֲרוּסָה שֶׁנָּדְרָה וְשָׁמַע אָבִיהָ וְלֹא שָׁמַע אֲרוּסָהּ וְנִתְגָרְשָׁה בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם וְנִתְאָרְסָה לְאַחֵר בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם אֲפִלּוּ לְמֵאָה אָבִיהָ וּבַעְלָהּ הָאַחֲרוֹן מְפֵרִין נְדָרֶיהָ שֶׁנָּדְרָה בִּפְנֵי אָרוּס רִאשׁוֹן. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא יָצָאתָה לִרְשׁוּת עַצְמָהּ שָׁעָה אַחַת שֶׁעֲדַיִן הִיא בִּרְשׁוּת הָאָב מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהִיא נַעֲרָה:

¹¹[The following rules apply when] a consecrated maiden takes a vow, her father heard her vow, but not her erus,40For if her first erus heard her vow and did not nullify it, her father can no longer nullify it together with her second erus. See Halachah 17. she was divorced that day and then consecrated by another person41Or consecrated again by her first erus [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:13)]. that day.42It is necessary that the divorce(s) and the consecration(s) take place on the same day the father heard of and nullified the vow. For if not, the woman's last erus will not have the right to nullify the vow, as indicated by Chapter 12, Halachah 17. Even if [she was divorced and consecrated] 100 times [that day], her father and her last erus may nullify the vows she took before her first erus. [The rationale is that] she never departed into her own domain for one moment,43In contrast to the laws applying to a married woman, as stated in the following halachah. for throughout the entire time, she is in her father's domain, for she is still a maiden.

י״באֲבָל הָאִשָּׁה הַנְּשׂוּאָה שֶׁנָּדְרָה וְלֹא הֵפֵר לָהּ בַּעְלָהּ וְגֵרְשָׁהּ בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם וְהֶחֱזִירָהּ בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר שֶׁהֲרֵי יָצָאתָה לִרְשׁוּת עַצְמָהּ אַחַר שֶׁנָּדְרָה. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנָּדְרָה בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ וְהִיא עַתָּה בִּרְשׁוּתוֹ הוֹאִיל וְיָצְתָה בִּרְשׁוּת עַצְמָהּ בֵּינְתַיִם נִתְקַיְּמוּ נְדָרֶיהָ:

¹²When, by contrast, a married woman took a vow and her husband did not nullify it, he divorced her that day, and remarried her that day, he cannot nullify her vows,44Nor may her father nullify her vows, for once she marries, her father no longer has the right to nullify her vows. for she departed into her independent domain after she took her vow.45Once a woman becomes independent for even one moment, her future husband cannot nullify the vows she took previously. Although she took her vow in his domain and she is now in his domain, since she departed into her own domain in the interim, her vows are binding.

י״גנַעֲרָה מְאֹרָסָה שֶׁנָּדְרָה וְלֹא שָׁמַע אָבִיהָ וְלֹא בַּעְלָהּ וְנִתְגָרְשָׁה וְנִתְאָרְסָה לַאֲחֵרִים. אֲפִלּוּ לְאַחַר כַּמָּה יָמִים כְּשֶׁיִּשְׁמַע הָאָב וְהַבַּעַל הָאַחֲרוֹן מְפֵרִין נְדָרֶיהָ שֶׁנָּדְרָה בִּפְנֵי אָרוּס הָרִאשׁוֹן הוֹאִיל וְלֹא שָׁמַע אוֹתָם הָאָרוּס הָרִאשׁוֹן:

¹³[The following rule applies when] a consecrated maiden took a vow that was not heard by either her father or her erus,46If, however, either her erus or her father heard her vow when it was taken, it cannot be nullified at a later date. she was divorced, and then consecrated to someone else.47Since she remains partially in her father's domain, the divorce does not effect the right of her father and her present erus to nullify her vows. Even several days after [she took the vow], when her father and her last erus hear about the vow that she took while consecrated to her first erus, they may nullify it, since her first erus did not hear it.

י״דנַעֲרָה מְאֹרָסָה שֶׁנָּדְרָה וְשָׁמַע אָבִיהָ לְבַדּוֹ וְהֵפֵר לָהּ וּמֵת הָאָרוּס קֹדֶם שֶׁיִּשְׁמַע וְנִתְאָרְסָה בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם אֲפִלּוּ לְמֵאָה אָבִיהָ וַאֲרוּסָהּ הָאַחֲרוֹן מְפֵרִין נְדָרֶיהָ שֶׁנָּדְרָה בִּפְנֵי אָרוּס רִאשׁוֹן שֶׁמֵּת קֹדֶם שֶׁיִּשְׁמַע:

¹⁴[The following rule applies when] a consecrated maiden took a vow, her father alone heard it and nullified it, but the man to whom she was consecrated died before hearing it. If she was consecrated to another man - or to 100 other men - that day48The consecration and the nullification of the vow must take place on the day that the father heard of the vow and nullified it (Turei Zahav 234:22). her father and her last erus may nullify her vow.49Since her first erus did not hear of her vow, the fact that he died before nullifying it does not deprive her last erus of that right. The father cannot nullify her vow alone, because it was taken when she was consecrated. Since her father nullified the vow, the right of her erus to nullify the vow is weak and of little substance. Accordingly, the right to nullify it cannot be transferred to the father alone, as in Halachah 16.The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:16) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of the Tur which maintains that the second erus can never nullify a vow together with the father.

ט״ושָׁמַע אָרוּס רִאשׁוֹן וְהֵפֵר וּמֵת וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁמַע הָאָב וְנִתְאָרְסָה לְאַחֵר בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם אָבִיהָ עִם הָאָרוּס הָאַחֲרוֹן מְפֵרִין נְדָרֶיהָ:

¹⁵[The following rule applies when] the erus heard [her vow], nullified it and died and afterwards,50I.e., after the death of her erus. her father heard and she was consecrated to another person that day.51But not on the following day. The Radbaz explains that this is speaking about a situation when the father heard of the vow on the same day as her first erus, for the nullification must be completed on the same day that he heard of the vow. If, however, her father does not hear about it until the following day and she was consecrated then, he and her new erus may nullify her vow then. Her father and the second erus may nullify her vows.52The Turei Zahav 234:13 maintains that the Rambam would also give her father the right to nullify the vow alone, because her first erus also heard the vow and did not maintain it (see the following halachah). The Rambam mentions her being consecrated by another person only to teach that if, this is indeed the situation, the second erus must also nullify the vow.

ט״זשָׁמַע אָבִיהָ וְלֹא שָׁמַע הָאָרוּס וּמֵת בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם הָאָרוּס אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁמַע גַּם הָאָרוּס וְהֵפֵר אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁתַק וּמֵת בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם נִתְרוֹקְנָה רְשׁוּת לָאָב וְהָאָב יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. שָׁמַע הָאָרוּס וְקִיֵּם וּמֵת בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁמַע וְשָׁתַק וּמֵת בַּיּוֹם שֶׁלְּאַחֲרָיו אֵין הָאָב יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר:

¹⁶If her father heard [that she took a vow], but the erus did not and the erus died that day or the erus also heard [about her vow] and nullified it or remained silent53Since he did not maintain the vow and died before the day was completed, we say that there was a possibility that he would nullify it. Hence, her father is given the right to nullify it. and then died that day, she returns to her father's domain and her father may nullify [her vows].54Since her erus no longer exists and he did not maintain the vow, the right to nullify is given to her father. In his gloss to Halachah 19, the Radbaz explains the apparent contradiction between these two halachot by stating that this halachah refers to an instance where the father did not nullify the vow before the erus died. Accordingly, the right of the erus to nullify the vow is not weakened. Hence it can be transferred to the father. Halachah 19 refers to a situation where the father nullified the vow and weakens it, as explained above.If the erus heard [about her vow] and maintained it and died that day, or remained silent and died the following day,55Since he did not nullify it on the day that he heard it, he cannot nullify again. It is considered as if he maintained it. Once he maintained it, her father cannot nullify it. her father cannot nullify her vow.

י״זגֵּרְשָׁהּ הָאָרוּס אַחַר שֶׁשָּׁמַע. הֲרֵי זֶה סָפֵק אִם הַגֵּרוּשִׁין כִּשְׁתִיקָה וְיָפֵר הָאָב עִם הַבַּעַל הָאַחֲרוֹן שֶׁיְּאָרֵס בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם אוֹ הַגֵּרוּשִׁין כְּמוֹ שֶׁקִּיֵּם אָרוּס רִאשׁוֹן שֶׁכְּבָר נִתְקַיְּמוּ הַנְּדָרִים:

¹⁷If the erus, divorced her after hearing [of her vow], there is an unresolved question whether the divorce is considered as silence and her father may nullify her vow together with a second erus who consecrates her that day.56I.e., combining Halachah 15 which states that the father and the second erus can nullify the vow and Halachah 16 which states that silence is equivalent to nullification. If she does not become consecrated again, the father can nullify the vow alone (Turei Zahav, loc. cit.). Or perhaps the divorce is like her first erus maintaining her vow, in which instance, the vow is maintained.57And cannot be nullified afterwards.

י״חשָׁמַע הָאָב וְהֵפֵר לָהּ וּמֵת הָאָב וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁמַע הַבַּעַל אֲפִלּוּ שָׁמַע הַבַּעַל קֹדֶם שֶׁיָּמוּת הָאָב לֹא נִתְרוֹקְנָה רְשׁוּת לַבַּעַל וְאֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר לְעוֹלָם אַחַר מוֹת הָאָב. שֶׁאֵין הָאָרוּס מֵפֵר אֶלָּא בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת:

¹⁸When the father heard the vow and nullified it and then died and then the erus heard [of the vow] or even if the erus heard of the vow before the death of the father,58But did not nullify it then. she is not transferred [entirely] to the domain of her erus. He cannot ever nullify the vow after the father's death, for an erus can nullify a vow only together [with the father].

י״טשָׁמַע אָרוּס וְהֵפֵר לָהּ וּמֵת וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁמַע הָאָב. אוֹ שֶׁשָּׁמַע הָאָב וְהֵפֵר לָהּ וּמֵת הַבַּעַל קֹדֶם שֶׁיִּשְׁמַע. אֵין הָאָב לְבַדּוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר נְדָרִים אֵלּוּ שֶׁנִּרְאוּ לְאָרוּס רִאשׁוֹן אֶלָּא בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת אָרוּס הָאַחֲרוֹן אִם נִתְאָרְסָה בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:

¹⁹If the erus heard [the vow], nullified it, and died and then the father heard or the father heard and nullified it and the erus died before he heard it, the father cannot nullify these vows that were in the jurisdiction of the first erus except together with a second erus to whom she is consecrated that day,59If, however, he nullifies on a later date it is unacceptable, for the father must nullify the vow on the day he became aware of it. as we explained.60Halachah 15. In his gloss to this halachah, the Radbaz explains the apparent contradiction between this halachah and Halachah 16 by stating that Halachah 16 refers to an instance where the father did not nullify the vow before the erus died. Accordingly, the right of the erus to nullify the vow is not weakened. Hence it can be transferred to the father. This halachah refers to a situation where the father nullified the vow and weakens it. Hence it cannot be transferred as explained in the notes to Halachah 15. This understanding is reflected in the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:16).

כ׳נָדְרָה וְהֵפֵר לָהּ אָבִיהָ לְבַדּוֹ וְלֹא שָׁמַע הָאָרוּס עַד שֶׁנִּכְנְסָה לִרְשׁוּתוֹ אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר שֶׁאֵין הַבַּעַל מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי אֲרוּסָתוֹ אַחַר שֶׁנִּשֵּׂאת אֶלָּא קֹדֶם שֶׁתִּכָּנֵס לִרְשׁוּתוֹ הוּא שֶׁמֵּפֵר בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת הָאָב. לְפִיכָךְ הָיָה דֶּרֶךְ תַּלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֵּצֵא בִּתּוֹ מֵרְשׁוּתוֹ אוֹמֵר לָהּ כָּל נְדָרִים שֶׁנָּדַרְתְּ בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתִי הֲרֵי הֵן מוּפָרִין:

²⁰If a woman took a vow, her father nullified it alone, and her husband did not hear [of the vow] until he brought her into his domain,61I.e., completed the second stage of the marriage, nissuin. he cannot nullify [her vow]. For a husband cannot nullify a vow taken by the woman he consecrated after he marries her.62See Halachah 8. Instead, [this must be done] before she enters his domain, when he nullifies it together with her father. For this reason,63I.e., to enable all the vows concerning which he did not hear to be nullified. it was the practice of Torah Sages to tell their daughters before they left their domain:64I.e., before their marriage. "All the vows which you took while in my household are nullified."

כ״אוְכֵן הַבַּעַל עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּכָּנֵס לִרְשׁוּתוֹ אוֹמֵר לָהּ כָּל נְדָרִים שֶׁנָּדַרְתְּ מִשֶּׁאֵרַסְתִּיךְ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּכָּנְסִי בְּתוֹךְ בֵּיתִי הֲרֵי הֵן מוּפָרִין שֶׁהַבַּעַל מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא שָׁמַע אוֹתָם:

²¹Similarly, the husband would tell her before she enters his domain: "All of the vows that you took from the time I consecrated you65An erus may also nullify the vows that a woman took before he consecrated her (together with her father). We assume, however, that her father already nullified those vows (Siftei Cohen 234:21; Turei Zahav 234:11). until you entered my home are nullified." For a husband66This also applies to her father. The husband and the father must, however, be capable of hearing. If they are deaf, they cannot nullify a vow (Chapter 12, Halachah 13). can nullify the vows of his wife even though he did not hear them.67Thus if both the father and the husband made these statements, the vows are nullified. In some manuscript copies of the Mishneh Torah, these two halachot are combined as one.

כ״בהָלַךְ הָאָב עִם שְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל אוֹ שֶׁהָלְכוּ שְׁלוּחֵי הָאָב עִם שְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל עֲדַיִן אָבִיהָ וּבַעְלָהּ מְפֵרִין נְדָרֶיהָ. מָסַר הָאָב לִשְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל אוֹ שֶׁמָּסְרוּ שְׁלוּחֵי הָאָב לִשְׁלוּחֵי הַבַּעַל אֵין הָאָב יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר שֶׁהֲרֵי יָצָאת מֵרְשׁוּתוֹ וְלֹא הַבַּעַל יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר שֶׁאֵין הַבַּעַל מֵפֵר בְּקוֹדְמִין כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:

²²If the father went with the agents of the husband68Who were sent to bring her to her husband's home. or the father's agents went with the agents of the husband, her vows must still be nullified by her father and her husband jointly.69As long as her father is accompanying her, he is not considered to have transferred her to her husband's domain and hence, still has the right to nullify her vows. If her father transferred her to the agents of her husband or her father's agents transferred her to her husband's agents, her father can no longer nullify her vows.70I.e., even if the husband dies [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:12)]. Nor may the husband nullify them. For the husband cannot nullify vows that were taken before [he married her], as we explained.71See Halachah 20.

כ״גשׁוֹמֶרֶת יָבָם אֲפִלּוּ עָשָׂה בָּהּ יְבָמָהּ מַאֲמָר וַאֲפִלּוּ יָבָם אֶחָד לִיבָמָה אַחַת אֵינוֹ מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי יְבִמְתּוֹ עַד שֶׁיָּבוֹא עָלֶיהָ:

²³When a woman is waiting for yivum72I.e., we are speaking about a widow whose husband dies childless who must be married by her deceased husband's brother. See Deuteronomy, ch. 25. - even if the yevam already made a statement of his intent,73Which is similar to consecration, but not entirely analogous to consecration (see Hilchot Yibbum ViChalitzah 2:1). and even if there is only one yevam and one yevamah74And thus there is no question that she is designated for him. - [the yevam] may not nullify her vows until he is intimate with her.75At which point their marriage is consummated and she becomes his wife. Until then, even if he has stated his intent, according to Scriptural Law, she is not his wife and he cannot nullify her vows.

כ״דהָיְתָה יְבִמְתּוֹ נַעֲרָה מְאֹרָסָה לְאָחִיו וְאָבִיהָ קַיָּם אֵין הַיָּבָם וְאָבִיהָ מְפֵרִים נְדָרֶיהָ כְּאַחַת אֶלָּא הָאָב לְבַדּוֹ הוּא שֶׁמֵּפֵר כָּל שֶׁתִּדֹּר וַאֲפִלּוּ עָשָׂה בָּהּ הַיָּבָם מַאֲמָר אֵינָהּ כְּנַעֲרָה מְאֹרָסָה. שֶׁאֵין הַמַּאֲמָר קוֹנֶה בִּיבָמָה קִנְיָן גָּמוּר כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:

²⁴When a yevamah who is a maiden had been [merely] consecrated to [her deceased husband] and her father is alive, the yevam and her father do not nullify her vows together. Instead, her father alone is the one who nullifies any vow that she takes.76As stated in Halachah 10. Even if the yevam stated his intent to marry her, she is not considered as a consecrated maiden, for a statement of intent does not [establish] a complete [marriage bond between] a yevamah [and her yevam], as we explained.77Which is similar to consecration, but not entirely analogous to consecration (see Hilchot Yibbum ViChalitzah 2:1).

כ״הנַעֲרָה שֶׁהִשִּׂיאָהּ אָבִיהָ וְנִתְאַלְמְנָה אוֹ נִתְגָּרְשָׁה מִן הַנִּשּׂוּאִין הֲרֵי זוֹ כִּיתוֹמָה בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב. וְאֵין אָבִיהָ מֵפֵר נְדָרֶיהָ וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁעֲדַיִן הִיא נַעֲרָה:

²⁵When a maiden who was given in marriage by her father is widowed or divorced after marriage,78I.e., she has already completed nissuin, the second stage of the marriage bond. she is like an orphan in her father's lifetime. Her father does not have the right to nullify her vows even if she is a maiden.79I.e., although from the standpoint of age, her father would still have the right to nullify her vows, since she married, she is given full independence. Hence, he no longer has this right.

כ״ונַעֲרָה מְאֹרָסָה שֶׁנָּדְרָה וְלֹא שָׁמְעוּ נְדָרֶיהָ אָבִיהָ וּבַעְלָהּ עַד שֶׁבָּגְרָה אוֹ עַד שֶׁנַּעֲשֵׂית יְתוֹמָה בְּחַיֵּי הָאָב הֲרֵי נְדָרֶיהָ קַיָּמִים וְאֵין הַבַּעַל יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר שֶׁהֲרֵי יָצָאת מֵרְשׁוּת אָבִיהָ שֶׁהוּא מֵפֵר עִמּוֹ בְּשֻׁתָּפוּת וַעֲדַיִן לֹא נִכְנְסָה לִרְשׁוּת הַבַּעַל:

²⁶When a consecrated maiden takes a vow, but neither her father or her husband heard of her vows until she came of age80As stated in Halachah 7, once she comes of age, her father no longer has any authority over her. or until she became like an orphan in her father's lifetime,81I.e., she was divorced or widowed after marriage, as stated in the previous halachah. her vows are binding; they cannot be nullified by her erus.82I.e., in the first situation, the man who consecrated her before she came of age. In the second situation, it refers to a second husband who consecrated her after she was divorced or widowed. [The rationale is that] she departed from her father's domain and he [and her erus] must nullify her vows together and she has not entered her husband's domain.83This occurs only after nissuin. Moreover, even after she enters her husband's domain, he cannot nullify her vows that were taken beforehand, as stated in Halachah 20.

א׳כָּל הַנְּדָרִים וְהַשְּׁבוּעוֹת הָאָב מֵפֵר בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר ל ו) "כָּל נְדָרֶיהָ וֶאֱסָרֶיהָ". אֲבָל הַבַּעַל אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר אֶלָּא כָּל נְדָרִים וּשְׁבוּעוֹת שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן עִנּוּי נֶפֶשׁ אוֹ שֶׁהֵן בִּדְבָרִים שֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ כְּגוֹן שֶׁנִּשְׁבְּעָה אוֹ נָדְרָה שֶׁלֹּא תִּכְחל אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תִּתְקַשֵּׁט שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר ל יז) "בֵּין אִישׁ לְאִשְׁתּוֹ":

¹A father [has the right to] nullify any1I.e., he may nullify all vows, not merely those that a husband may nullify.Rabbenu Asher and other Rishonim differ and maintain that the Sifri states that the father's rights are the same as the husband's. In a response attributed to the Rambam, he explains that although this view is stated in the Sifri, it is not mentioned anywhere else in the Talmud and the simple meaning of the Biblical passage does not lead to such an inference. This leads to the conclusion that the statement of the Sifri is a minority opinion. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:58) mentions both views without stating which one should be followed. vows and oaths [taken by his daughter only] on the day he hears of them,2I.e., not necessarily on the day the vow was taken, but on the day he first heard of it. as [Numbers 30:6] states: "[But if her father withheld her on the day that he heard,] all of her vows and prohibitions3The Emek HaShaalah interprets this term as referring to oaths.... [shall not stand]."A husband,4I.e., after nissuin, the second stage of the marriage relationship. by contrast, may nullify only those vows and oaths that involve personal aggravation5For Numbers 30:14 specifically mentions a husband's authority involving vows of this type. Vows that involve personal aggravation refer to vows that involve accepting a prohibition of a particular type of satisfaction. or they are matters that affect the marriage relationship6Literally, those "between him and her.", e.g., she took an oath or a vow not to put on eye-paint or wear jewelry.7Such conduct could arouse a husband's displeasure, for he will not be happy that his wife does not appear attractive.The Shulchan Aruch (234:59) mentions other views which consider these vows as ones that involve personal aggravation as well as the Rambam's view that these are matters that affect the husband-wife relationship. [This is implied by ibid.:17]: "between a man and his wife."

ב׳וּמַה בֵּין נְדָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן עִנּוּי נֶפֶשׁ לִדְבָרִים שֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ. שֶׁהַנְּדָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן עִנּוּי נֶפֶשׁ מֵפֵר אֶל עַצְמוֹ וְאֶל אֲחֵרִים. וְשֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ לְעַצְמוֹ מֵפֵר וְלַאֲחֵרִים אֵינוֹ מֵפֵר:

²What is the difference between [the laws governing] vows that involve personal aggravation and those that affect the marriage relationship. With regard to vows that involve personal aggravation, his nullification has bearing for himself and for others.8I.e., even if he divorces her, the vow is nullified. With regard to those involving the marriage relationship, his nullification has bearing for himself but not for others.9The nullification applies only when they are married.

ג׳כֵּיצַד. נָדְרָה שֶׁלֹּא לֶאֱכל בָּשָׂר מֵפֵר לָהּ וְתִהְיֶה מֻתֶּרֶת לֶאֱכל עִם כָּל אָדָם לְעוֹלָם. אָסְרָה עָלֶיהָ תַּשְׁמִישׁ כָּל אָדָם שֶׁבָּעוֹלָם יָפֵר חֶלְקוֹ וְתִהְיֶה מְשַׁמַּשְׁתּוֹ. וּכְשֶׁיָּמוּת אוֹ יְגָרְשֶׁנָּה הֲרֵי הִיא אֲסוּרָה בְּתַשְׁמִישׁ כָּל אָדָם. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

³What is implied? She took a vow not to eat meat. He may nullify it and she will be permitted to eat meat if she is married to any other person forever. If she forbade marital intimacy with any man, he may nullify the vow with regard to himself10See Halachah 9 with regard to clarification when this vow must be nullified and when it need not be nullified. The Siftei Cohen 234:83 quotes views that maintain that since the vow takes effect with regard to other men, it would also take effect with regard to him if he did not nullify it. and she may engage in intimacy with him. If, however, he dies or divorces her, she is forbidden to engage in intimacy with all other men. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

ד׳אֶחָד עִנּוּי גָּדוֹל וְאֶחָד עִנּוּי קָטָן וְאֶחָד עִנּוּי שֶׁהוּא לִזְמַן מְרֻבֶּה אוֹ לְפִי שָׁעָה הַכּל מֵפֵר הַבַּעַל:

⁴Whether the aggravation is of a minor nature or a major nature, for a short time or for a long time, the husband has the right to nullify all [such] vows.

ה׳כֵּיצַד. נָדְרָה אוֹ נִשְׁבְּעָה שֶׁלֹּא תִּרְחַץ הַיּוֹם. אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תִּשְׁתֶּה יַיִן הַיּוֹם. אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאכַל הַיּוֹם דְּבַשׁ. וְכֵן אִם נָדְרָה שֶׁלֹּא תִּכְחל הַיּוֹם אוֹ שֶׁלֹּא תִּלְבַּשׁ רִקְמָה הַיּוֹם מֵפֵר. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה. אֲפִלּוּ נָדְרָה מִמַּאֲכָל רַע אוֹ מִמִּין שֶׁלֹּא טָעֲמָה אוֹתוֹ מִיָּמֶיהָ הֲרֵי זֶה יָפֵר:

⁵What is implied? She took a vow or an oath "not to bathe today," "not drink wine today," or "not to eat honey today,"11These are considered vows that involve personal aggravation. he may nullify the vows. [This also applies if] she vowed "not to put on eye paint today" or "not to wear colored woven garments today."12These are considered vows affecting the marriage relationship. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations. Even if she took a vow [not to partake of] an unpleasant food13Our translation follows the gloss of the Kessef Mishneh. The Chatam Sofer explains that since it is forbidden to eat unpleasant foods on Yom Kippur - when fasting is described as aggravating one's soul - even unpleasant foods are included in this category.The Turei Zahav 234:51, however, translates the term as "harmful foods," arguing that if the woman considered the food unpleasant and had no desire for it, it would not be considered as "aggravation" for her to be prevented from partaking of it. or a type of food that she had never eaten,14Since she never partook of this food, there is room to say that no aggravation would be caused by prohibiting it. Hence it is necessary to emphasize that it is forbidden. [her husband] may nullify it.

ו׳נָדְרָה מִשְּׁתֵי כִּכָּרוֹת בְּאַחַת יֵשׁ לָהּ עִנּוּי וּבְאַחַת אֵין לָהּ עִנּוּי מֵפֵר לְזוֹ שֶׁמִּתְעַנָּה בָּהּ וְאֵינוֹ מֵפֵר לְזוֹ שֶׁאֵין לָהּ עִנּוּי:

⁶When she took a vow not to partake of two loaves of bread and not partaking of one would cause her aggravation, but not partaking of the other would not cause her aggravation,15The Kessef Mishneh quotes Rabbenu Asher's commentary to Nedarim 82b which explains that this refers to a situation where one loaf is made of fine flour and is attractive and one is made of coarse flour and is not. She will suffer aggravation from not eating the first, but not from not eating the second.There is a slight difficulty with this explanation, because the previous halachah stated that a husband may nullify even a vow involving unpleasant food. It can be explained, however, that since her husband makes it possible for her to partake of the loaf of fine bread, she will have no aggravation over not partaking over the coarse bread. When, however, she is not able to partake of the unpleasant food, she has no similar alternative.Alternatively, Rabbenu Asher explains that she is hungry and will be satisfied by eating one loaf. Hence, not eating that loaf will give her aggravation. Not eating the second one will not. her husband may nullify the one that would cause her aggravation and may not nullify the one that would not cause her aggravation.16The Kessef Mishneh notes that when a sage absolves a vow, if he nullifies a portion of the vow, the entire vow is nullified (Chapter 4, Halachah 11). This principle does not, however, hold true with regard to a vow nullified by a husband.

ז׳נָדְרָה שֶׁלֹּא תֹּאכַל תְּאֵנִים שֶׁל מְדִינָה זוֹ יָפֵר מִשּׁוּם דְּבָרִים שֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ שֶׁעֵסֶק גָּדוֹל הוּא לוֹ לְהִטָּפֵל וּלְהָבִיא לָהּ מִמְּדִינָה אַחֶרֶת. לְפִיכָךְ אִם מֵת אוֹ גֵּרְשָׁהּ אוֹ שֶׁהֵבִיא לָהּ אִישׁ אַחֵר מִפֵּרוֹת אוֹתָהּ מְדִינָה הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין עָלֶיהָ שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֵפֵר לַאֲחֵרִים בִּדְבָרִים שֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ:

⁷When a woman takes a vow not to eat figs from her native country, [her husband] may nullify her vow, because this is a matter that affects the marriage relationship.17I.e., it is not a matter of aggravation, because she may eat figs. Nevertheless, obtaining the figs places a difficulty upon her husband. Although it also mentions the Rambam's view, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:60) appears to follow the view of other Rishonim who maintain that this is also considered a vow involving aggravation. For it is a major problem for him to undertake the difficulty of bringing her [figs] from another place. Therefore, if he dies, divorces her, or another person brings her figs from her native country, they are forbidden to her. For [a husband's] nullification [of a vow that] affects the marriage relationship does not have bearing for others.18As stated in Halachah 2.

ח׳וְכֵן אִם נָדְרָה שֶׁלֹּא לְהַנּוֹת לַבְּרִיּוֹת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין הַבַּעַל בַּכְּלָל יֵשׁ לוֹ לְהָפֵר מִשּׁוּם דְּבָרִים שֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ. שֶׁלֹּא יִהְיֶה זָקוּק לְהַאֲכִילָהּ מִשֶּׁלּוֹ בִּלְבַד. וְכֵן אִם אָסְרָה הֲנָאָתָהּ עַל אֻמָּה (כֻּלָּהּ) כְּגוֹן [כָּל] הַיְהוּדִים אוֹ כָּל הַיִּשְׁמְעֵאלִים הֲרֵי זֶה יָפֵר:

⁸Similarly, if she took an oath not to benefit from people at large, even though her husband is not included in the vow,19I.e., this point is obvious. Even if she does not say so explicitly, she may benefit from him without him having to nullify the vow. he has the right to nullify it, because it affects the marriage relationship.20The Mishnah (Nedarim 11:3) quotes Rabbi Yossi who rules that one may not nullify such a vow. In his Commentary to the Mishnah, the Rambam explains that this is a minority view.The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:64) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of other Rishonim who maintain that such a vow is considered one which involves personal aggravation. Otherwise, he will have to give her food only from his own resources. Similarly, he may nullify [the vow] if she [takes a vow], forbidding her from benefiting from an entire nation,21Our translation is based on the Kessef Mishneh who states that the wording of the original is inexact. e.g., all the Jews or all the Ishmaelites.

ט׳הָאִשָּׁה שֶּׁאֲמָרָהּ לְבַעְלָהּ הֲנָאַת תַּשְׁמִישִׁי אֲסוּרָה עָלֶיךָ אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהָפֵר. הָא לְמָה זֶה דּוֹמֶה לְאוֹסֵר פֵּרוֹת חֲבֵרוֹ עַל בַּעַל הַפֵּרוֹת. וְכֵן הוּא שֶׁאוֹמֵר לָהּ הֲנָאַת תַּשְׁמִישִׁי אֲסוּרָה עָלַיִךְ לֹא אָמַר כְּלוּם מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מְשֻׁעְבָּד לָהּ בִּשְׁאֵר כְּסוּת וְעוֹנָה כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ בְּהִלְכוֹת אִישׁוּת. אֲבָל אִם אָמְרָה לוֹ הֲנָאַת תַּשְׁמִישְׁךָ אֲסוּרָה עָלַי צָרִיךְ לְהָפֵר. וְאִם לֹא הֵפֵר הֲרֵי זֶה אָסוּר לְשַׁמְּשָׁהּ שֶׁאֵין מַאֲכִילִין אֶת הָאָדָם דָּבָר הָאָסוּר לוֹ:

⁹When a woman tells her husband: "Pleasure from intimacy with me is forbidden to you," he need not nullify the vow.22I.e., even if he does not nullify the vow, it does not take effect. To what can the matter be compared? To one who forbids the owner of fruit from benefiting from his own fruit.23See Chapter 5, Halachah 3. By agreeing to marriage, a woman gives her husband rights to marital intimacy that cannot be withheld. Similarly, if he tells her: "Pleasure from intimacy with me is forbidden to you," his statements are of no consequence, because he is obligated to provide her with her sustenance, clothing, and intimacy, as we explained in Hilchot Ishut.24Hilchot Ishut 12:2, based on Exodus 21:10.If, however, she told him: "Pleasure from intimacy with you is forbidden to me," he must nullify the vow.25Since the vow does not forbid anything to the man, it will take effect unless he nullifies it. See also parallels in Hilchot Ishut 14:7 and Chapter 1, Halachah 30, above.Based on Chapter 3, Halachah 10, it must be concluded that we are referring to an instance where she said "Your body is forbidden to me," for satisfaction is not a tangible matter (Rashba, as quoted by Turei Zahav 234:57; Siftei Cohen 234:81). Tosafot maintains that even if he does not say "Your body...," we consider it as if he did. This intent is reflected in the wording chosen by the Shulchan Aruch. If he does not nullify it, it is forbidden for him to engage in relations with her, because we may not force a person to partake of food that is forbidden to him.

י׳אָמְרָה יִקְדְּשׁוּ יָדַי לְעוֹשֵׂיהֶן אוֹ שֶׁנָּדְרָה שֶׁלֹּא יֵהָנֶה בְּמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ אֵינוֹ נֶאֱסָר בְּמַעֲשֵׂה יָדֶיהָ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁיָּדֶיהָ מְשֻׁעְבָּדִין לוֹ. שֶׁאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאָמְרוּ הַשִּׁחְרוּר וְהֶחָמֵץ וְהַהֶקְדֵּשׁ מַפְקִיעִין הַשִּׁעְבּוּד חֲכָמִים עָשׂוּ חִזּוּק לְשִׁעְבּוּד הַבַּעַל שֶׁאֵינָהּ יְכוֹלָה לְהַפְקִיעוֹ מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא מִדִּבְרֵיהֶם. אֲבָל צָרִיךְ הוּא לְהָפֵר שֶׁמָּא יְגָרְשֶׁנָּה וְתִהְיֶה אֲסוּרָה לַחְזֹר לוֹ:

¹⁰If she said: "May my hands be sanctified to the One who made them," or she took a vow that he would not benefit from the labor of her hands,26I.e., in both cases, she is consecrating the future products of her labor to the Temple treasury. She must, however, be careful to phrase the vow in a manner that she is not consecrating an entity that does not exist. For then the vow would not be effective [Nedarim 85a; Rama (Yoreh De'ah 234:71)]. See also Hilchot Arachin 6:28. he is not forbidden to benefit from the labor of her hands, because her hands are on lien to him.27I.e., one of the rights given to a husband is the right to benefit from his wife's labor (Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit.). Although [our Sages] declared:28Ketubot 59b; Nedarim 86b. "Emancipation,29Of a servant. If a servant was designated as security for a debt and was then freed by his master, he is a free man and is not in any way subjugated to the person who had the lien (Hilchot Malveh ULoveh 18:6). [the prohibition against] chametz,30If a Jew designated leavened products (chametz) as security for a loan to a gentile, when the prohibition against benefiting from chametz takes effect, the lien is no longer effective and the chametz reverts to the ownership of the Jew and he is obligated to destroy it. and consecration31If an ox was designated as security for a loan and then its owner, the borrower, consecrated it, the lien is severed and the lender must collect the debt from another source. See also Hilchot Arachin 7:5. sever a lien," our Sages reinforced a husband's lien [on his wife's work and her earnings], preventing her from severing it, because it is of Rabbinic origin.32As in several other instances, our Sages reinforced their decrees, giving them more power than Scriptural Law (see Chapter 3, Halachah 9 for another example). The rationale is that if Rabbinic Law was not given this additional measure of strength, people might treat it lightly. He must, however, nullify the vow, lest he divorce her and then he be forbidden to remarry her.33For her vow would take effect after the divorce and then, he would not be able to remarry her because he would then be forbidden to benefit from her work, including her performance of household tasks, thus creating an impossible situation.See Turei Zahav 234:63 who explains why we mention this concern in this instance and not in others where it would seemingly apply.

י״אנִשְׁבְּעָה אוֹ נָדְרָה שֶׁלֹּא יֶהֱנֶה בָּהּ לֹא אֲבִי בַּעְלָהּ וְלֹא אֶחָיו וּשְׁאָר קְרוֹבָיו אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר. וְכֵן אִם נָדְרָה שֶׁלֹּא אֶתֵּן מַיִם לִפְנֵי בְּהֶמְתְּךָ וְתֶבֶן לִפְנֵי בְּקָרְךָ וְכַיּוֹצֵא בִּדְבָרִים אֵלּוּ שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן עִנּוּי נֶפֶשׁ וְאֵינָם מִדְּבָרִים שֶׁבֵּינוֹ לְבֵינָהּ וְאֵינָהּ מִמְּלָאכוֹת שֶׁהִיא חַיֶּבֶת בָּהֶן הֲרֵי זֶה אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר:

¹¹If she took an oath or a vow that neither the father of her husband, his brothers, or any of his other relatives will benefit from her, he cannot nullify the vow.34For, as reflected by Hilchot Ishut 21:3, she is not under any obligation to perform work on behalf of these people. Similarly, he may not nullify her vow if she vows not to bring his animal35I.e., the animal he rides upon. water,36As Hilchot Ishut 21:5 states, she is obligated to provide straw for his riding animal. She is not, however, obligated to provide water for it, for it is necessary to draw water from a spring or river and that is compromising to a woman's modesty (Kessef Mishneh). As mentioned in the notes to Hilchot Ishut, loc. cit., the Rambam's ruling is based the version of Ketubot 61b cited by Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi. The standard published text of the Talmud follows a different understanding. straw for his cattle,37She is obligated to provide straw for the animal he rides upon, for that is an expression of consideration for her husband's person. She has no such obligation with regard to his cattle, for those animals are necessary only for work and that is solely her husband's concern. or the like. [The rationale is that these vows] do not aggravate the soul, nor do they affect the marriage relationship, [since] they are not of the tasks that she is obligated to perform.38I.e., were she obligated to perform these tasks, her vow not to perform them would not take effect.

י״ביֵשׁ לַבַּעַל וְלָאָב לְהָפֵר נְדָרִים שֶׁעֲדַיִן לֹא חָלוּ וְלֹא נֶאֶסְרָה בָּהֶן. כֵּיצַד. כְּגוֹן שֶׁאָמְרָה הַיַּיִן אָסוּר עָלַי אִם אֵלֵךְ לְמָקוֹם פְּלוֹנִי הֲרֵי זֶה מֵפֵר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁעֲדַיִן לֹא הָלְכָה וְלֹא נֶאֶסְרָה. וְכֵן כָּל כַּיּוֹצֵא בָּזֶה:

¹²A husband and a father may nullify vows that have not taken effect and have not yet caused prohibitions for her.39A sage, by contrast, may only absolve an oath or a vow after it takes effect (Hilchot Sh'vuot 6:14). What is implied? She said, for example: "Wine will be forbidden to me if I go to this-and-this place."40The Rambam's ruling is cited by the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:28). The Kessef Mishneh and the Rama quote the ruling of Rabbenu Yerucham who maintains that this principle applies only with regard to vows that have not taken effect because the time when they are due to take effect has not come. If, however, they are dependent on a deed, they cannot be nullified until they take effect. See the comments of the Siftei Cohen 234:45 which discusses this issue. Even though she has not yet gone there and [thus the wine] is not yet forbidden, the vow may be nullified. Similar laws apply in all analogous situations.

י״גהָאָב אוֹ הַבַּעַל שֶׁאֵין שׁוֹמְעִין אֵינָם מְפֵרִין. אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהַבַּעַל מֵפֵר נְדָרִים שֶׁלֹּא שְׁמָעָן הָרָאוּי לִשְׁמֹעַ אֵין הַשְּׁמוּעָה מְעַכֶּבֶת בּוֹ:

¹³A father or a husband who is deaf41This applies even if he is not both deaf and dumb [Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:25)]. may not nullify vows.42For Numbers 30:5 speak of her father hearing. Implied is that if he cannot hear, he cannot nullify the vow (Sifri to the verse). Even though a husband may nullify vows which he has not heard,43Chapter 11, Halachah 21. This also applies with regard to her father, as indicated by Halachah 20 of that chapter. when a person is fit to hear a vow, [the fact that he does not] hear it is not of consequence.44Rabbenu Asher [quoted by Rama (Yoreh De'ah 234:25)] differs and maintains that it is necessary for him to hear the vow.

י״דהַשּׁוֹטֶה אֵינוֹ מֵפֵר בֵּין אָב בֵּין בַּעַל. הַקָּטָן אֵין לוֹ אִישׁוּת לְפִיכָךְ אֵינוֹ מֵפֵר. וְהַבַּעַל מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי שְׁתֵּי נָשָׁיו כְּאַחַת. וְכֵן הָאָב מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי שְׁתֵּי בְּנוֹתָיו כְּאַחַת:

¹⁴Neither a father, nor a husband who is intellectually or emotionally unstable may nullify a vow. A minor cannot establish a marriage bond;45See Hilchot Ishut 4:7; 11:6. accordingly, he may not nullify a vow. A husband may nullify the vows of two of his wives simultaneously. Similarly, a father may nullify the vows of two of his daughters simultaneously.46The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:29) quotes the Rambam's ruling, but mentions that there are other Rishonim who differ regarding this issue.

ט״והֲפָרַת נְדָרִים כָּל הַיּוֹם וְאֵינָהּ מֵעֵת לְעֵת. כֵּיצַד. נָדְרָה בִּתְחִלַּת לֵיל שֵׁנִי הֲרֵי מֵפֵר כָּל אוֹתוֹ הַלַּיְלָה וְכָל יוֹם שֵׁנִי. נָדְרָה בְּיוֹם שֵׁנִי בִּתְחִלַּת הַיּוֹם מֵפֵר כָּל אוֹתוֹ הַיּוֹם. נָדְרָה בְּסוֹף הַיּוֹם עִם חֲשֵׁכָה אִם הֵפֵר לָהּ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תֶּחְשַׁךְ מוּפָר. וְאִם לֹא הֵפֵר לָהּ עַד שֶׁחֲשֵׁכָה אֵינוֹ יָכוֹל לְהָפֵר:

¹⁵The nullification of vows may be carried out throughout the entire day.47I.e., until nightfall, as the Rambam continues to explain. [The right does not continue] for 24 hours.What is implied? If she took a vow at the beginning of Sunday night, the vow may be nullified throughout that night and the entire day Monday.48The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:29) quotes the Rambam's ruling, but mentions that there are other Rishonim who differ regarding this issue. When she took a vow at the conclusion of the day, directly before nightfall. If he49I.e., neither a husband, nor a father. nullified the vow before nightfall, it is nullified. If he did not nullify it until after nightfall, he may not nullify it any longer.50For the day on which he heard the vow has passed.

ט״זוּמַהוּ זֶה שֶׁכָּתוּב בַּתּוֹרָה (במדבר ל טו) "מִיּוֹם אֶל יוֹם". מְלַמֵּד שֶׁמֵּפֵר בַּלַּיְלָה אִם נָדְרָה בַּלַּיְלָה. וְכֵן מֵפֵר כָּל הַיּוֹם כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ. נָדְרָה וְשָׁהֲתָה כַּמָּה יָמִים וְאַחַר כָּךְ שָׁמַע הָאָב אוֹ הַבַּעַל הֲרֵי זֶה מֵפֵר בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ וּכְאִלּוּ נָדְרָה בְּעֵת שֶׁשְּׁמָעָהּ שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר ל ו) (במדבר ל יג) "בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ" לֹא בְּיוֹם נִדְרָהּ בִּלְבַד:

¹⁶What is meant by the Torah's words [Numbers 30:15]: "from one day to the next"?51Which seemingly implies a 24 hour period. They teach that if she takes a vow at night, he may nullify it during the night. And he may nullify it throughout the following day, as we explained.52In the previous halachah.If she took a vow and waited several days and only then, her father or her husband heard of it, he may nullify it on the day he heard of it. It is as if she took the vow on the day that he heard of it, as [implied by ibid.:6]: "On the day he heard of it," [i.e.,] and not only the day she took the vow.

י״זנַעֲרָה מְאֹרָסָה שֶׁנָּדְרָה וְשָׁמַע אָבִיהָ וְהֵפֵר וּלְאַחַר יָמִים שָׁמַע הָאָרוּס וְהֵפֵר בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ אֵין זֶה מוּפָר. שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר ל ו) "וְאִם הֵנִיא אָבִיהָ אוֹתָהּ בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ" וְגוֹ' (במדבר ל ז) "וְאִם הָיוֹ תִהְיֶה לְאִישׁ וּנְדָרֶיהָ עָלֶיהָ" (במדבר ל ח) "וְשָׁמַע אִישָׁהּ בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ" וְגוֹ' הָא לָמַדְתָּ שֶׁאַחַר שֶׁהֵפֵר הָאָב וְשָׁמַע הָאָרוּס הֲרֵי זֶה מֵפֵר בְּיוֹם שְׁמוֹעַ הָאָב. וְהוּא הַדִּין אִם שָׁמַע אָרוּס וְהֵפֵר וְאַחַר כַּמָּה יָמִים שָׁמַע הָאָב וְהֵפֵר בְּיוֹם שָׁמְעוֹ שֶׁאֵינוֹ מוּפָר. וּמִנַּיִן שֶׁבְּנַעֲרָה מְאֹרָסָה הַכָּתוּב מְדַבֵּר שֶׁהֲרֵי הוּא אוֹמֵר לְמַטָּה (במדבר ל יא) "וְאִם בֵּית אִישָׁהּ נָדָרָה" וְגוֹ' (במדבר ל יב) "וְשָׁמַע אִישָׁהּ וְהֶחֱרִשׁ לָהּ" וְגוֹ' מִכְּלַל שֶׁאִישָׁהּ הָאָמוּר לְמַעְלָה אָרוּס כְּמוֹ שֶׁבֵּאַרְנוּ:

¹⁷When a consecrated maiden took a vow and her father heard of it and nullified it and after several days her erus heard of it and nullified it on the day he heard of it, it is not nullified, as [implied by ibid.:6-8]: "If her father prevented her on the day that he heard of it.... If she was married to a man with vows incumbent upon her.... If her husband heard of it. On the day, he heard of it...." From this we infer: Since her father nullified it and her erus heard of it, he must nullify it on the day the father heard of it. Similarly, if her erus heard [of the vow] and nullified it and after several days, the father heard of it and nullified it on the day he heard of it, it is not nullified.53I.e., according to the Rambam, regardless of who hears about the vow and nullifies it first, the father and the husband must both nullify it on the same day. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 234:5) quotes the Rambam's view, but also that of the Ramban and Rabbenu Asher who maintain that the father and the husband do not have to nullify the vow on the same day. As long as each one nullifies it on the day he hears of it, it is nullified. The Siftei Cohen 234:13 quotes the opinion of the Bayit Chadash who rules that we should be stringent and follow the Rambam's decision.How do we know that the verse is speaking about a consecrated maiden? Because further on, the passage [ibid.:11-12] states: "If she vows in her husband's home...54I.e., this obviously applies after nissuin, when the woman is living in her husband's home. her husband heard her and remained silent." We can infer that the husband spoken about previously is an erus., as we explained.

י״חשָׁמַע הָאָב אוֹ הַבַּעַל וְשָׁתַק כְּדֵי לְצַעֲרָהּ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה בְּלִבּוֹ לְקַיֵּם נִדְרָהּ הוֹאִיל וְעָבַר הַיּוֹם וְלֹא הֵפֵר וְלֹא בִּטֵּל נִתְקַיְּמוּ נְדָרֶיהָ. נָדְרָה וְהֵפֵר לָהּ הָאָב אוֹ הַבַּעַל וְהִיא לֹא יָדְעָה שֶׁהֵפֵר וְעָבְרָה עַל נִדְרָהּ אוֹ עַל שְׁבוּעָתָהּ בְּזָדוֹן הֲרֵי זוֹ פְּטוּרָה וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוְּנָה לְאִסּוּר הוֹאִיל וְנַעֲשָׂה הַהֶתֵּר פְּטוּרָה וְעַל זֶה נֶאֱמַר (במדבר ל ו) "וַה' יִסְלַח לָהּ כִּי הֵנִיא אָבִיהָ אֹתָהּ". וּמַכִּין אוֹתָהּ מַכַּת מַרְדּוּת מִפְּנֵי שֶׁנִּתְכַּוְּנָה לְאִסּוּר:

¹⁸When a father or a husband hears of a vow and remains silent in order to cause the woman aggravation,55I.e., he intended to nullify her vow afterwards, but desired that she think that the vow is binding so that she will take the matter more seriously. if the day passes without him nullifying or revoking [her vows], they are binding even if he did not have the intent of accepting them.If she took a vow and her father or her husband nullified it, but without knowing of the nullification, she willfully violated her vow or oath, she is not liable. Although she had the intent of transgressing, since she committed a permitted act,56I.e., since the vow was nullified, there is no prohibition involved in the action. she is exempt. Concerning this, [ibid.:6] states: "God will forgive her, although her father prevented her." She is given stripes for rebellious conduct,57A punishment instituted by the Rabbis. because she had the intent to transgress.

י״טנָדְרָה וְעָבְרָה עַל נִדְרָהּ קֹדֶם שֶׁיָּפֵר לָהּ אָבִיהָ אוֹ בַּעְלָהּ אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁשָּׁמַע בּוֹ בַּיּוֹם וְהֵפֵר לָהּ הֲרֵי זוֹ חַיֶּבֶת עַל דָּבָר שֶׁעָבְרָה בּוֹ. אִם מַלְקוֹת מַלְקוֹת וְאִם קָרְבָּן קָרְבָּן:

¹⁹When she takes a vow and violates her vow before her father or her husband nullifies it, she is liable - either for lashes58If she transgressed willfully. or a sacrifice59If she transgressed inadvertently. - for the transgression she committed even if he heard of it that day and nullified it.60In contrast to the repeal of a vow by a sage, when a father or a husband nullify a vow, they do not nullify it retroactively, only from the time of their actions onward. See the notes to Chapter 13, Halachah 2.

כ׳שָׁמַע נִדְרָהּ וְשָׁתַק מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא הָיָה יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָאָב אוֹ לַבַּעַל לְהָפֵר. אוֹ שֶׁיָּדַע שֶׁיֵּשׁ לָהֶם לְהָפֵר אֲבָל לֹא יָדַע שֶׁנֵּדֶר זֶה צָרִיךְ הֲפָרָה וּלְאַחַר זְמַן יָדַע הֲרֵי זֶה יָפֵר וּשְׁעַת יְדִיעָתוֹ כְּאִלּוּ הִיא שְׁעַת הַנֵּדֶר אוֹ שְׁעַת שְׁמוּעָתוֹ וְיָפֵר כָּל הַיּוֹם:

²⁰If a father or a husband heard of [a woman's] vow, but remained silent, because he did not know that a father or a husband has a right to nullify her vows or he knew that he had a right to nullify her vow, but did not know that such a vow required nullification, when he learns of this, he may nullify [the vow]. The time when he gains this knowledge is equivalent to the time of the vow or the time he heard of it and he may nullify it for that entire day.

כ״אנָדְרָה אִשְׁתּוֹ וְסָבוּר שֶׁהִיא בִּתּוֹ וְהֵפֵר לָהּ עַל דַּעַת שֶׁהִיא בִּתּוֹ. וְכֵן אִם נָדְרָה בְּנָזִיר וְסָבוּר שֶׁנָּדְרָה בְּקָרְבָּן וְהֵפֵר לָהּ עַל דַּעַת שֶׁנָּדְרָה קָרְבָּן. אָסְרָה עַצְמָהּ בִּתְאֵנִים וְסָבוּר [שֶׁאָסְרָה עַצְמָהּ] בַּעֲנָבִים וְהֵפֵר לָהּ עַל דַּעַת שֶׁנָּדְרָה לֶאֱסֹר [עַצְמָהּ] בַּעֲנָבִים צָרִיךְ לַחְזֹר וּלְהָפֵר כְּשֶׁיֵּדַע הַנֵּדֶר וְהַנּוֹדֶרֶת לְשֵׁם הַנּוֹדֶרֶת הַזֹּאת וּלְשֵׁם הַנֵּדֶר הַזֶּה שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (במדבר ל יב) "לֹא הֵנִיא אָבִיהָ אֹתָהּ" לְנוֹדֶרֶת עַצְמָהּ וְאוֹמֵר (במדבר ל ה) "וְשָׁמַע אָבִיהָ אֶת נִדְרָהּ" עַד שֶׁיֵּדַע אֵי זֶה נֵדֶר נָדְרָה. וְיֵשׁ לוֹ לְהָפֵר אוֹתוֹ כָּל יוֹם הַיְדִיעָה:

²¹[When a nullification is made in error,] one must return and nullify it again. [For example,] his wife took a vow and he thought that she was his daughter, and he nullified it with the intent that she was his daughter. She took a nazirite vow and he thought that she had vowed [to offer] a sacrifice and he nullified it with the intent that she had vowed [to offer] a sacrifice. She forbade herself to partake of figs and he thought she said grapes and nullified with the intent that she had forbade grapes. [In all such instances,] he must nullify the vow again when he learns of the vow and the identity of the woman taking the vow for the sake of this woman and this vow. [This can be inferred from ibid.:5]: "Her father did not prevent her"; [this indicates that he must have in mind] the woman taking the vow herself. "And her father heard her vow,"61Significantly, the Sifri derives the same concept from a different verse. i.e., until he knows the vow that she took. He may nullify the vow throughout the entire day that he discovers this information.62For the day he discovers new information concerning the vow is equivalent to the day he hears of it.